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NOTES
THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION
UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
Eric Berger
The South African Constitution epitomizes a new breed of modern constitution, enshriningsocioeconomic rights ratherthan only "negative" liberties. Among these is the right to education. However, despite the Constitution's progressive values, many South African schools remain inadequate.
This Note argues that, given the opportunity, the South African Constitutional Court should hold the current educationalsystem unconstitutionalas
applied to the worst schools. Constitutional text, purpose, and precedent,
indeed, mandate this outcome. Moreover, vindicating the constitutional
right to education will help South Africa attain other social and economic
goals. However, in keeping with its other socioeconomic rights cases, the
Court must carefully craft its decision so as not to offend separation-of-powers principles. The Court must thus provide the legislature enough flexibility
to consider budgetary and other constraints while ultimately protecting education's vital role in a healthy democracy.
INTRODUCTION

That education is fundamental to a well-functioning democracy has
been long accepted. Thomas Jefferson well articulated the connection
between education and democracy, arguing that to render democratic
governments safe, the people's "minds must be improved to a certain degree" and that therefore "[a]n amendment of our [Virginia] constitution
must here come in aid of the public education."' And yet, despite their
generally acknowledged importance, schools frequently fail to receive the
resources necessary to improve.
Nowhere is this paradox more evident than contemporary South Africa, where the country has included the right to education in its emphatically modern Constitution,2 but where schools, particularly for poor
blacks, remain woefully inadequate. The explanation for these shortcomings is obvious-the nation simply lacks the resources to address all its
citizens' needs-and yet the consequences are significant. Even after the
fall of apartheid, South Africa is the world's third most economically unequal country. 3 If South Africa is to become an "open and democratic
1. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 148 (William Peden ed., Univ. of
N.C. Press 1955) (1787).
2. All references to the South African Constitution refer to the 1996 Constitution, as
opposed to the interim constitution it replaced.
3. See Viviene Taylor, United Nations Development Programme, Transformation for
Human Development: South Africa 64 (Susan de Villiers ed., 2000) (ranking Brazil,
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society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, ' 4 its education
system must work to remedy the country's stark inequalities by providing
all students the skills and experiences necessary to participate productively in such a society. Given the right to education established in section 29 of the Constitution and the Constitutional Court's recent attention to other socioeconomic rights, 5 unhappy parents might consider
launching a claim that the government's current system of education is
inadequate.
This Note argues that should such a case arise, the Constitutional
Court should find that the South African Constitution requires the government to provide an adequate education and that therefore the current educational system is unconstitutional as applied to the worst
schools. However, balancing socioeconomic rights with economic limitations is no easy task. Thus, this Note also explores education's place
within that intractable problem and the South African Court's role in
expounding the country's aspirational constitution. Ultimately, it concludes that protecting vulnerable groups' constitutional right to education will, in the long run, help South Africa attain its other constitutional,
social, and economic goals, but that the Court, in keeping with its other
socioeconomic rights decisions, must craft its decision so as not to offend
separation-of-powers principles.
Part I details the current state of education in South African schools,
focusing on conditions in some of the country's most disadvantaged communities where facilities and student achievement are poor, especially
compared to the nation's wealthier schools. Part II applies the constitutional right to education to this school system. Section 29 of the Constitution establishes the right to basic and further education. It does not articulate a specific standard of education, but this Note argues that the
standard must be "adequate," high enough to satisfy the democratic and
civic ideals articulated in section 39, which provides courts with an interpretive framework for the Bill of Rights. Given this standard, then, the
Court should find the worst schools' conditions unconstitutional under
section 29 and section 9's equal protection provisions, even though the
nation's limited resources make it difficult to comply entirely with the
Constitution's requirements. Part III argues that the Court should define
"adequacy" by exploring schools' crucial roles in well-functioning democGuatemala, and South Africa as the three most unequal societies in the world as measured
by the Gini coefficient); see also Arthur Chaskalson, Dialogue: Equality & Dignity in South
Africa, 5 Green Bag 2d 189, 189 (2002) (noting that three centuries of colonialism and fifty
years of apartheid "created a society with huge disparities-disparities of wealth, of
privilege, of opportunities, of skills").
4. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 39(1)(a).
5. See, e.g., Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign, 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC)
(holding that government must make every effort to include in HIV education and
treatment program everybody for whom treatment could combat mother-to-child
transmission of HIV); Gov't of Rep. of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (holding
that government had obligation to make housing progressively available).
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racies and that improved education will also help the nation address
other social problems. Indeed, democratic theories of education, which
American case law can help elucidate, ought not only inform the Court's
definition of adequacy, but can provide broader philosophical and practical justifications for a judicial decision requiring the other government
branches to do more to improve schools.
I.

THE

QUALITY

OF EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Like most injustices in contemporary South Africa, educational inequality can be traced easily back to apartheid. Shortly after the National
Party victory in 1948, 6 the architects of apartheid implemented a formalized system of race-based education. Codified in the Bantu Education
Act of 1953 and the Extension of University Education Act, national education policy was an integral part of apartheid's dehumanizing segregation. 7 African 8 schools were thus designed accordingly, training students
in subservience and manual labor. 9
Decades later, even after the country's first free elections in 1994 and
school desegregation, the lingering effects of such policies are visible in
poor schooling for students of all ages. " A recent study shows that South
African pupils at age ten are "way behind" those in many other African
6. The National Party represented South Africa's Afrikaner minority and, shortly after
its victory, instituted apartheid, thus intensifying and codifying the country's racist,
segregationist system. See, e.g., Allister Sparks, The Mind of South Africa 147-213 (1990)
(recounting National Party's rise to power after World War I1).
7. Id. at 196.
8. This Note uses the adjectives "African" and "black" synonymously, in this case to
refer to schools attended by black students. Most South African scholarship also uses these
terms interchangeably. It is also important to remember that South African racial groups
are hardly confined to blacks and whites but also include other prominent groups, most
notably "coloureds" and Indians. See, e.g., id. at 72-90. To highlight the educational
inequalities in South Africa, however, this Note will focus on the differences between
primarily black and primarily white schools.
9. Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Constitutional Comparisons and Converging Histories:
Historical Developments in Equal Educational Opportunity Under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New South African Constitution, 26
Hastings Const. L.Q. 853, 873 (1999). The apartheid government also sought to
emphasize existing power structures by requiring all students to learn Afrikaans, the
language of oppression. Opposition to this policy sparked the 1976 Soweto riots. See, e.g.,
Sparks, supra note 6, at 301 (noting that "enforced use of the Afrikaans language in black
schools was the detonator that set off the eruption" in Soweto). See generally William
Finnegan, Crossing the Line: A Year in the Land of Apartheid (1994) (recounting year
teaching in Cape Town township school during apartheid).
10. See Paul Taylor, South Africa Quietly Integrates Schools, Wash. Post, Jan. 29,
1995, at Al (noting that the first attempt at forced desegregation was remarkably peaceful
but that few white schools have become more than fifteen or twenty percent black). The
South African Constitution distinguishes between "basic" education (up to tenth grade)
and "further" education (tenth grade and beyond). See infra Parts II.A, II.B.2. The
discussion here will not separate the analysis of basic and further education into separate
categories, because many of the relevant statistics reflect patterns in entire school districts
which include all grade levels and therefore both basic and further education.
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countries, such as Botswana and Madagascar. t ' Nowhere are the inadequacies more evident than in predominantly black areas; apartheid's impact on the education of African children, particularly in the rural
"homelands,"' 2 remains severe. 13 As Minister of Education Kader Asmal
grimly acknowledged, "South Africa is two nations, poor and rich. After
apartheid, when this two nation status is no longer kept in place by violence but by the workings of inertia and of continuing privilege, the
higher education system, in large measure, continues to reproduce the
14
inequities of the past."
Indeed, a number of factors conspire to make poor schools hard to
improve. Perhaps most important, recent government economic policies, as reflected in the 1998 Growth, Employment and Redistribution
Programme (GEAR), have begun to prioritize fiscal discipline rather than
social redress, designing policies to achieve low inflation rates and debt
control.1 5 The government has thus begun to decentralize and privatize
many social benefits, including education.' 6 Not surprisingly, government educational expenditures have decreased noticeably, 17 and it is the
poorest schools that have been hardest hit.
11. Karen MacGregor, Analysis at Age 10 Reveals Failure, Times (London), Sept. 1,
2000, Educ. Supp., at 10. Since many children in Africa leave school at age ten,
achievement levels at this age are particularly important. Id.
12. Diamond, supra note 9, at 901. Under apartheid, the National Party moved large
portions of the African population into small, rural areas, causing overpopulation and
profoundly disrupting more than half a million lives. The government claimed that these
"homelands" were in fact independent nations and that the black and white populations
were each better off with this "separate but equal" arrangement. Of course, artificially
devised and forcefully realized, these homelands, cut off from the outside world, more
resembled "resettlement camps." They were far from equal and suffered years of dire
poverty and disease. Sparks, supra note 6, at 202-05.
13. Despite its best intentions, the early post-apartheid governments had little money
to throw at inadequate black schools. Thus, "dilapidated schools, unqualified teachers,
overcrowded classrooms, poor discipline and a culture of protest ... continued to bedevil
black education." Taylor, supra note 10. Indeed, since school funding blends public and
private funding, the richer white schools that enjoyed preferred governmental treatment
under apartheid still tend to be better funded. See International Development Network,
RTI Offers Course in Applied Education Economics in South Africa (Apr. 8, 1999), at
http://www.idn.org/members/org/rti/rti40899-4.htm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
14. Kader Asmal, Minister of Education, Address at the Media Launch of the National
Plan for Higher Education (Mar. 5, 2001), available at http://education.pwv.gov.za/
Media/Speeches_2001/March0l/NatPlanHE.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law
Review). As the statistics here demonstrate, the inequities to which Asmal refers apply also
to basic education.
15. Sophie Oldfield, The South African State in Transition: A Question of Form,
Function, and Fragmentation, in The State, Education, and Equity in Post-Apartheid South
Africa 32, 43 (Enver Motala & John Pampallis eds., 2002) [hereinafter Motala &
Pampallis].
16. Katerina Nicolaou, The Link Between Macroeconomic Policies, Education
Policies and the Education Budget, in Motala & Pampallis, supra note 15, at 53, 89.
17. E.g., Oldfield, supra note 15, at 43.
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Budget reductions compound a number of difficulties poor schools
already face. For instance, most schools, even in the poorest areas,
charge "users' fees" to all parents;'I budget cuts force schools to rely even
more on these fees to provide an education. Many poor parents have
difficulty paying these fees, meaning either that their children do not
receive an education or that the schools do not receive adequate funding
to instruct their students. Not surprisingly, these "tuition" requirements
perpetuate the very inequalities that education theoretically would help
9
the nation overcome.1
Providing underprivileged schools with a qualified faculty presents
another major challenge. Good teachers tend to prefer staying in better
schools, and even those who might be inclined to help a poorer school
might find the logistics of moving prohibitively difficult.2 0 The government policy of strict fiscal discipline further exacerbated the teacher
shortage in poor schools when the state offered its teachers voluntary severance packages, which led to the retirement of many of the most experienced and most qualified teachers.2 ' To compound the problem, the
higher education system for training teachers has also suffered recent
cutbacks, resulting in fewer trained teachers to replace those who opted
for early retirement. 22 Rich communities can compensate by voting to
hire extra teachers and offering higher salaries to recruit the most qualified instructors, but poor schools are left to rely on government funding. 23 This funding is, in theory, equal between rich and poor schools,
18. E.g., Salim Vally & Yolesa Dalamba, S. Afr. Hum. Rts. Comm'n, Racism, Racial
Integration and Desegregation in South African Public Secondary Schools 47 (1999); Daria
Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality: Discrimination as an Emergent Phenomenon, Persp. in
Educ. (S. Afr.) (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality].
19. E.g., Roithmayr, Locked in Inequality, supra note 18, at 1. See generally Daria
Roithmayr, The Constitutionality of School Fees in Public Education, 19 S. Afr. J. Hum.
Rts. (forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Roithmayr, Constitutionality of School Fees]
(questioning constitutionality of such fees). But see Department of Education (S. Mr.),
Report to the Minister: A Review of the Financing, Resourcing, and Costs of Education in
Public Schools 81 (March 3, 2003), available at http://education.pwv.gov.za [hereinafter
Report to Minister] (explaihing that the poorest parents can apply for exemptions from
school fees).
20. See, e.g., Luis Crouch, Educational Spending Inequality in South Africa: Some
Key Issues and Quantitative Dimensions, Talking Points Prepared for Colleagues at
Department of Education (S. Afr.) (June 2000) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Crouch, Inequality] (noting difficulty of reallocating high-quality educators).
Crouch, former economic consultant to the national Department of Education in Pretoria,
argues that these systematic problems make it extremely difficult for poor schools to catch
up to wealthier ones. Id.
21. Oldfield, supra note 15, at 44. See generally Salim Vally & Console Tleane, The
Rationalisation of Teachers and the Quest for Social Justice in Education in an Age of
Fiscal Austerity, in Motala & Pampallis, supra note 15, at 178 (discussing fiscal constraints
on policies designed to redistribute teachers to poorer schools).
22. Oldfield, supra note 15, at 44.
23. See, e.g., id. ("schools with a wealthy parent body utilise fees to maintain their
privilege and standard of education relative to predominantly black schools that are
already disadvantaged"). This is one similarity between South African and American
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but the broader policy trend towards privatization has created even
greater inequalities, as it forces communities to rely more heavily on nongovernmental money.
Similarly, poor schools began with inferior facilities and supplies and
at current funding rates will not be able to catch up.2 4 Once again, this
problem exacerbates preexisting inequalities. Because poor children
tend to have less exposure to the letters of the alphabet at an early age,
they are inherently harder and more expensive to teach. 25 Without additional funding to provide remedial literacy training and materials,
schools in poor neighborhoods will be unlikely to overcome the educational obstacles inherent in poverty.2 6 Indeed, such concerns suggest
that the poorer schools need significantly more funding than richer
schools if education is truly to benefit all South Africans.
Given the difficulties facing many South African schools and the government's reluctance to provide the funding to address them, 27 it is not
surprising that their facilities and achievement rates are poor. Statistics
are an incomplete measure of educational quality, but they do paint a
general picture of a school district's needs. Even after the African National Congress (ANC) government came to power, black education remained vastly inferior to white education, 28 despite the fact that educational equity became a basic principle of the budget strategy. 29 Recent
studies show that pupil-to-teacher ratios in the Eastern Cape, Northern
Province, and Mpumalanga, all predominantly black, rural provinces,
education problems. American public school funding, much of which comes from
property taxes, also gives big advantages to wealthier school districts. Some state courts
have held that the resulting inequities violate state and federal equal protection
requirements. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (holding that
California public school financing, which conditioned availability of school revenue on
district wealth, violated state constitution's equal protection provisions). For further
comparison between American and South African education law, see infra Part II1.
24. See, e.g., E-mail Interview with Luis Crouch, Former Economic Consultant to the
National Department of Education in Pretoria (Sept. 14, 2002) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., id.; Nicolaou, supra note 16, at 103-04 (noting that privatization will
result in an even more prominent social schism); see also Report to Minister, supra note
19, at 17-18 (noting introduction of "pro-poor school" funding in 2000 has sought to bring
about more equity in schools but that inequality is still a concern).
27. To be fair, education comprises about 20% of the national budget. E.g.,
Nicolaou, supra note 16, at 71, 77. However, the aforementioned move towards fiscal
discipline has shrunk the entire budget, thus decreasing the annual amount spent on
education and other government services. Id. at 89.
28. See Mixing up South Africa, Economist, Jan. 25, 1995, at 17, 18 (noting that as of
early 1995 South Africa still spent twice as much on white pupils as it did on black pupils).
29. See Department of Education (S. Afr.), White Paper on Education and Training,
General Notice 196 of 15 March 1995, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa ch. 11,
para. 1(3), at 61 [hereinafter White Paper] (discussing budget reform and funding
requirements of the new education system).
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were, respectively, 51 to 1, 44 to 1, and 41 to 1.30 By way of contrast, in
the Western Cape Province, which is predominantly white, the pupil-toteacher ratio was 25 to 1.31 Moreover, the Western Cape has approximately eight teachers per administrator, whereas the Northern Province
has thirty, a disparity that not only highlights inequality but also helps
explain why poorer schools have so much trouble catching up to wealthier ones: Without clerical and administrative assistance, teachers' chief
concerns are day-to-day management, not curricular reform and
32
improvement.
The poorest schools also lack the facilities enjoyed by wealthier communities. As recently as 2000, over 35% of all school buildings were in
"weak to very weak" condition, 33 and, of course, buildings needing the
most repairs were concentrated in poor, predominantly black, areas. A
recent analysis showed approximately one-half of the rural Northern
Province's 1.9 million students to have no water within walking distance
of their schools. Seventy-nine percent had no toilets, eighty percent no
telephones. Forty-one percent of Northern Province homeland schools
needed major repairs. 34 Urban black township schools, which continue
to fail as wealthy blacks move out of townships or arrange for their children to commute to predominantly white schools, fared no better, tend35
ing to be badly overcrowded and also lacking electricity and telephones.
In the Western Cape, by way of contrast, 90% of schools had telephones,
and only 1% required major repairs.3 6 These numbers, of course, directly reflect each province's education budget. Whereas the predominantly white Western Cape enjoys the highest per capita expenditure on
primary school education, the mostly black Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal,
Mpumalanga, and Northern Provinces have the lowest per capita expenditure levels.3 7 Not surprisingly, then, the Western Cape had the lowest
30. Diamond, supra note 9, at 901. Not surprisingly, most inequalities exist along
class, rather than racial, lines, so that schooling for poor whites is worse than for wealthy,
suburban blacks. However, because so many blacks continue to live in poverty and because
whites continue to control much of the country's wealth, it remains generally true that
predominantly black schools will be far inferior to predominantly white schools.
31. Id.
32. Luis Crouch, Fifteen Facts, Two Goals, and Some Likely Stories: The Dilemmas of
School Funding in South Africa 3 (Apr. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Crouch, Dilemmas].
33. Russell Andrew Wildeman, Infrastructure Provisioning in Schools and the Right to
Basic Education 15 (Univ. of Witswatersrand, Ctr. for Applied Legal Studies & Educ. Pol'y
Unit, Educ. Rights Project, Issue Paper No. 2, 2002).
34. Diamond, supra note 9, at 901.
35. Violet Madingoane, Hope in the Beloved Country, Times (London),Jan. 7, 2000,
Educ. Supp., at 10.
36. Diamond, supra note 9, at 901.
37. Department of Education (S. Afr.), Education for All 2000 Assessment (Mar.
2000), available at http://education.pwv.gov.za/DoE-Sites/QualityAssuranceFolder/
Educ-for All Assessment/EFA.._Report.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Education for All].
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percentage of under-qualified teachers (10.2%), while the Northwest,
Free State, and KwaZulu-Natal Provinces all had over 30% under-quali38
fied teachers.
Predictably, these gross inequalities in spending, facilities, and faculties have resulted in unequal achievement. Whereas only two of ten African children reach the "matric" year 39 in their education, eight of ten
white children do. 40 One result is that illiteracy is prevalent in South
Africa, and, again, the wealthier white provinces of the Western Cape and
Gauteng have the highest literacy rates (76.4% and 75.6% respectively),
while the rural, poor, and mostly black Northern Province has the lowest
(58.9%).41 Of course, apartheid schools explain why many older people
cannot read, but the Department of Education itself also cites poor teaching and lack of access to reading materials as reasons why learner achievement continues to be poor. 42 Indeed, the failure in the poor communities seems to start during the earliest years. Whereas a large majority of
white children proceed smoothly through elementary school, schools
have had difficulty retaining black students. A recent study of rural black
children showed that only 39% progressed from second to seventh grade
43
without some disruption.
What is perhaps most disconcerting is the lack of meaningful improvement. As recently as 1999, one-sixth of the nation's schools suffered
failure rates of 80% or more. 44 Some standards have even decreased:
38. Id. Of course, discrepancies run not only between provinces but within them.
The difficulty of moving top-rate teachers to poorer schools, due, in part, to South Africa's
rigid labor union structure, makes dealing with intraprovincial inequality a major problem.
Crouch, Inequality, supra note 20, at 1.
39. The "matric" year is the last year of high school, the equivalent of twelfth grade in
the United States.
40. Diamond, supra note 9, at 901-02. Different commentators have arrived at
slightly different numbers, but they paint the same general picture of inequality. See, e.g.,
Crouch, Dilemmas, supra note 32, at 2 (stating that about one-quarter of African children
enter life with a "matric pass," whereas usually two-thirds of whites do).
41. Education for All, supra note 37.
42. Id. Given that many black children's parents cannot read because of apartheid's
discriminatory education policies, one could argue that schools play an even larger role in
spreading literacy than they would in a society where more parents can themselves read
and play a role in teaching their children. Under this line of reasoning, one could argue
that the nation's poorest schools deserve not only equal but superior resources to make up
for the disadvantages these children face. This has not happened, despite the
Constitution's affirmative action provision. See S. Afr. Const. ch. 2, § 9(2) ("To promote
the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance
persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.").
43. Christine Liddell & Gordon Rae, Predicting Early Grade Retention: A
Longitudinal Investigation of Primary School Progress in a Sample of Rural South African
Children, 71 Brit. J. Educ. Psychol. 413, 418 (2001). The authors define "disruption" as
some difficulty that prevents children from proceeding naturally from one grade to the
next. Indications of disruptions include leaving school, switching schools, or repeating
grades. See id. at 422.
44. A Fillip for South Africa's Schools, Economist, Jan. 6, 2001, at 43, 43 [hereinafter
Fillip].
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For instance, between 1994 and 1999, the number of twelfth graders taking the advanced mathematics required for university engineering programs dropped from 88,000 to 69,000. 4 5 Far from effecting positive reforms, the Department of Education made things far worse, pensioning
off thousands of the country's best teachers and administrators and let46
ting academic standards slide.
Moreover, recent curriculum reform has brought mixed results, stalling improvement even more. In 2000, the government decided to abandon its "Curriculum 2005" after determining that it was "too complex for
most teachers" and neglected reading, writing, and arithmetic. 47 The
Outcomes-Based Education (OBE) that now underpins South African
curricular reform, while earning better marks than Curriculum 2005, has
proven to work best in "well-resourced" schools. 4 That the chosen path
of curricular reform works best in the schools that need the least help
demonstrates not only that the inequity persists but that government
measures to reform the system have so far failed to address the most serious problems. 49 To be fair, since arriving on the job in June 1999, Mr.
Asmal has received praise for his efforts, and the number of students pass50
ing their end-of-high-school exams has increased over the past year.
However, even these strides are misleading; the increased pass rate is partially due to new restrictions on the number of pupils retaking papers
51
they failed the previous year.
A final obstacle to improving the quality of education is the culture
of violence and sexual abuse that has become common in South African
public schools. A recent study by Human Rights Watch says that sexual
abuse by both teachers and other students is widespread in South African
45. Don Boroughs, New Opportunities for South Africa, ASEE Prism, May-June 1999,
at 18, 21.
46. Fillip, supra note 44, at 43; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
47. Karen MacGregor, Baffling Curriculum Dropped, Times (London), June 23,
2000, Educ. Supp., at 14.
48. David Macfarlane, Research: OBE Works Best in Resourced Schools, Mail &
Guardian (S. Afr.), Feb. 23-Mar. 1, 2001, at 26.
49. The federal government in South Africa determines most school funding, unlike
in the United States where education funding is a predominantly state and local issue.
While sections 229 and 230 of the Constitution do grant municipalities considerable
taxation and borrowing powers, these powers are still subject to national legislation and
regulation. Sections 139(1)(a) and (b) and 155(7) give the national and provincial
governments executive and legislative authority to oversee the municipalities' performance
of their functions. S. Afr. Const. ch. 6 (Provinces), § 139, ch. 7 (Local Government), § 155,
ch. 13 (Finance), §§ 229-230.
50. Fillip, supra note 44, at 43. As this Note was going to print, the Department of
Education issued a lengthy report indicating greater recognition of the problem than this
Part might indicate. It remains to be seen, however, whether this administrative attention
will translate into actual reform without judicial intervention. See Report to Minister,
supra note 19.
51. Fillip, supra note 44, at 43.
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schools. 52 The phenomenon is most frequent in the poorest, mostly
black neighborhoods, where some teachers take advantage of poor students by swapping small gifts for sex. 53 In addition to highlighting what
dangerous places South African schools have become, this trend is also
having a pronounced negative impact on girls' education. In the worst
neighborhoods, girls are coming to school less frequently and finding it
harder to concentrate when they do. 54 The government thus has to
worry not just about facilities and teaching, but school safety as well. If
administrators continue to turn a blind eye to their teachers' crimes, 55 it
will be increasingly difficult for the government to provide education for
young black women, who, finding themselves already "at the bottom of a
steep hierarchy of race, class and gender," are facing what one commentator has called an educational "emergency. "56
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION

The quality of education in South Africa, particularly in many
predominantly black areas, is poor, but to decide whether it is in fact
unconstitutional, the contours of the right to education must be understood. Section A of this Part introduces section 29 of the Constitution,
which promises the right to education, and argues that though the Constitution does not articulate a specific standard of schooling, it in fact
requires an "adequate" education consistent with notions of democracy
and citizenship. 5 7 By closely analyzing the language of the Constitution
and other Court decisions implicating socioeconomic rights, section B
applies this standard of education to the current situation and argues that
the Constitutional Court, given the opportunity, should find that the government has failed to meet its section 29 obligations for the poorest
schools.58 In doing so, however, it must not usurp the other government
52. Human Rights Watch, Scared at School: Sexual Violence Against Girls in South
African Schools 5 (2001).
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 61-64.
55. Id. at 74-76.
56. Ali A. Abdi, Economic Liberalization and Women's Education: Prospects for PostApartheid South Africa, 33 McGillJ. Educ. 71, 83 (1998).
57. Part II.A looks at the text of the South African Constitution to argue that it
requires the government to provide an adequate education. Part III defines this notion of
adequacy more thoroughly, drawing on broader conceptions of education's role in a
democracy.
58. Some might argue that while improved education is a noble and important goal in
contemporary South Africa, it is not the courts' place to effect such changes. However,
bureaucratic inertia and government corruption in South Africa conspire to make
standard legislative reforms ineffective. South African courts, then, play a particularly
crucial role in defining and protecting fundamental rights. See, e.g., Gov't of Rep. of S.
Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (defining and protecting right to adequate
housing). As indicated in note 50, the March 3, 2003 Department of Education Report
demonstrates administrative effort to which the Court should be sensitive, especially at
first. See Report to Minister, supra note 19. However, administrative gestures should not
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branches' roles. Section C explores the tensions between South Africa's
aspirational Constitution and its limited resources and argues that the
Court must uphold constitutionally protected socioeconomic rights, even
if it is unclear whether the government can fully realize them yet. Indeed, improved education will ultimately help the government realize
other constitutional objectives.
A. The ConstitutionalStandard of Education
The South African Constitution explicitly guarantees the right to education. Section 29 of the Constitution's Bill of Rights 59 states that "Everyone has the right (a) to a basic education... and (b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, must make
progressively available and accessible." 60 The Constitution clearly
promises some level of education; that level, though, is not so easy to
discern.
The White Paper on Education 6 defines "basic" education as "compulsory" schooling-pre-school through ninth grade-and "further" edudeterjudicial intervention if schools continue to remain poor, provided, of course, that the
Court not intrude too much on the other branches.
The Constitutional Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of South African
education. It has, however, decided other education cases, demonstrating that it is not
afraid of hearing cases involving complicated policy issues that some might argue are best
left for the legislature or Department of Education. See, e.g., Bel Porto School Governing
Body v. Premier of W. Cape Province, 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC) (upholding school
retrenchment program despite detrimental effect on some schools); Minister of Educ. v.
Harris, 2001 (4) SA 1297 (CC) (holding that Minister of Education exceeded powers
conferred upon him by section 3(4) of National Policy Act); In re Nat'l Educ. Policy Bill
83, 1996 (3) SA 289 (CC) (holding that bill did not impose obligation on provinces to
conform to national educational policy but that if it did, provinces would be obliged to
follow national policy); In re Gauteng School Educ. Bill of 1995, 1996 (3) SA 165 (CC)
(holding that Constitution imposes no positive obligation on the state to establish public
schools based on common language, culture, or religion); see also the Transvaal Provincial
Division of the Supreme Court's decision in Matukane v. Laerskool Potgietersrus, 1996 (3)
SA 223 (TPD) (determining that since plaintiffs had established prima facie case of racial
discrimination, burden of proof shifted to school to disprove discrimination and that
because school did not meet that burden, denial of admission to school contravened
mandate of nondiscrimination in education).
59. The second chapter of South Africa's Constitution is the Bill of Rights, consisting
of sections 7 through 39 of the Constitution. References to section 29 of the Constitution
and section 29 of the Bill of Rights thus refer to the same provision.
60. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 29(1).
61. The White Paper is a document written by the Department of Education,
describing "the first steps in policy formation by the Ministry of Education in the
Government of National Unity." White Paper, supra note 29, at ch. 1, para. 1. While they
obviously lack the force of a constitution, "White Papers" on various policy issues are
persuasive and have been consulted by judges and scholars alike to understand issues of
socioeconomic rights. See, e.g., Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at para. 47 (discussing the White
Paper on Housing in its discussion of section 26's right to housing); Matthew Chaskalson et
al., Constitutional Law of South Africa 38-9 (5th ed. 1999) (discussing White Paper on
Education in connection with constitutional right to education).
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cation as "post-compulsory" education-tenth grade and beyond. 6 2
Under the Constitution, basic education is a "strong positive right," a
right that can be asserted regardless of the state's other budgetary imperatives. 63 Unlike further education, which the government need only
make "progressively available" "through reasonable measures," 64 the right
to basic education appears absolute. While the government may decide
how to structure its schools, section 29(1) (a) gives constitutional support
to an unhappy parent who might demand that the state immediately provide her child with better education through the ninth grade.6 5 By way of
contrast, section 29(1) (b) provides not an absolute right to further education, but a right to reasonable governmental measures that make it progressively available. 66 Thus, a student in tenth grade or higher may be
able to show that her school fails to meet the constitutional standard, but
in order to obtain a judicial remedy she also will need to show that the
state has not made further education progressively available.
Though the Constitution provides for both basic and further education, section 29 does not make clear the quality of education the state
must provide, so we must turn to other constitutional provisions for guidance. 67 Does section 29 promise merely a place to go to school, or does
it provide for an "adequate" education?
Unlike some American state constitutions, which provide for a specific quality of education, 68 section 29 includes no such standard. A nar62. See White Paper, supra note 29, at ch. 5, paras. 14, 60 (discussing levels of
education). The White Paper discusses grade levels using both American and South
African terminology, because it intended for South Africa to switch to the American
format. The South African equivalent to ninth grade is "standard seven." The cut-off
between basic and further education remains a matter of controversy, see, e.g., Wildeman,
supra note 33, at 28, but for constitutional purposes the key point is the mere fact of the
distinction. This Note will refer to grade levels using the American terminology.
63. Chaskalson et al., supra note 61, at 38-1.
64. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 29(1)(b).
65. See Chaskalson et al., supra note 61, at 38-1 (discussing the nature of strong
positive rights).
66. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 29(1) (b); see also Chaskalson et al., supra
note 61, at 38-1 (discussing further education as "weak positive right").
67. As this Part argues, both basic and further education need to be "adequate."
Obviously, the curricular standards constituting "adequacy" will differ among age levels,
but they ought to be determined by reference to the same principles of democracy. In
other words, while further education is not an absolute right, when the government does
provide it (and the government does need to make it progressively available), it needs to
evaluate that further education with the same principles with which it evaluates basic
education.
68. The NewJersey Constitution, for instance, requires the legislature to "provide for
the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools." N.J.
Const. art. VIII, § 4,
1 (emphasis added). Other state constitutions require the
establishment of "an adequate public education" or an "ample" education. Michael A.
Rebell, Education Adequacy, Democracy and the Courts, in Achieving High Educational
Standards for All 218, 232 (Christopher Edley et al. eds., 2002). See generally William E.
Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation,
79 Educ. L. Rep. 19 (1993) (summarizing education clauses in state constitutions).
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row reading of the text might then find that any education-whether adequate or not-satisfies the "basic" and "further" requirements, so long as
it ostensibly addresses students in the relevant age or learning groups.
Merely providing the opportunity to attend school would satisfy the
state's constitutional obligations. However, the Constitution sets forth
general provisions with which to interpret the Bill of Rights, and, relying
on these, the Court should find that section 29 does in fact promise what
some American state jurisprudence would call "adequate" education. 69
The Bill of Rights itself opens with the insistence that the "state must
respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights," 70 thus
suggesting that the government must play an active role in continuing to
improve access to positive rights. Additionally, section 39 of the Constitution requires courts interpreting the Bill of Rights to "promote the values
that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity,
equality and freedom."'
Interpreting section 29 to require the state
merely to provide education, without any implicit quality standard, would
thus pervert section 39's interpretative instructions. Not only would such
an interpretation render section 29 virtually toothless, but also it would
run counter to the democratic values the Constitution explicitly seeks to
promote.
For a democracy to work, its populace must be educated enough to
research and analyze its choices. Political philosophers such as Thomas
Jefferson and John Dewey have long recognized the crucial role education plays in well-functioning democracies.7 2 Similarly, democratic societies protect their citizens' freedoms, so that people can pursue their goals
and pecuniary well-being. In poorer, developing nations, however, negative liberty might not be enough to secure each individual's opportunity
to compete in the marketplace; the government, in those instances,
might need to take additional steps to give people the chance to participate in the first place. Indeed, economist Amartya Sen has argued that
"[d] evelopment can be seen ... as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy." 7, To be sure, many democracies fall short of
this ideal, but the ideal nonetheless remains fundamental to democratic
theory. To argue, then, that section 29 promises a place to go to school,
but not an adequate education, would undermine section 39's requirement that the Bill of Rights be interpreted to foster the values of a free
74
and democratic society.
69. The Bill of Rights, section 39 in particular, lays out the values with which one can
determine exactly what quality of education is required. This Note uses the word
"adequate" to embody the sum of those values, but it emphasizes that the content of that
"adequacy" must be ascertained by reference to the South African Constitution itself.
70. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 7(2).
71. Id.§ 39(1)(a).
72. See infra Part 1I1.
73. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 3 (1999).
74. The primary treatise on South African constitutional law, written by leading South
African legal scholars, reasons similarly, noting that public education's role is 1) "as a
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Adequate education is, indeed, essential to the realization of dignity,
equality, and freedom.7 5 These section 39 values will not be realized universally in a single generation, but education offers the opportunity for
some to succeed despite the oppressive chains of the past. Without such
opportunity, South Africa's recently won civil and political freedoms
seem hollow. One great tragedy of contemporary South Africa is that
despite the replacement of a repressive, racist regime with a progressive,
enlightened one, many people's lives have changed little on a day-to-day
basis. Education is a vehicle for promoting equality and helping people
attain not merely political but also socioeconomic freedom.
Moreover, section 39 states that courts "must consider international
law" when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 76 One treaty to which the
Court has looked is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which specifically recognizes "the right of everyone to education .... [that is] directed to the full development of the
human personality and the sense of its dignity, and .. . [to] the respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms."7 7 Given that the covenant
speaks directly to the question of education, the Court should again turn

developer of human potential"; 2) "as a foundation for good citizenship"; and 3) "as a
provider of functional efficacy in the labour market." Chaskalson et al., supra note 61, at
38-2.
75. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 39(1)(a).
76. Id. § 39(1)(b) (emphasis added). South Africa's constitutional commitment to
human rights ideals is no accident. Much of international human rights law was
formulated in the very period South Africa was erecting its apartheid state, so South
Africa's human rights abuses profoundly shaped the course of that whole body of law. For
instance, the international struggle against apartheid resulted in numerous United Nations
General Assembly resolutions. Following emancipation, the liberators, themselves the
beneficiaries of the international community's disdain for the apartheid state, quickly
embraced international human rights. Professor Slye writes, "In what is certainly one of
the most abrupt shifts in international reputation, South Africa moved from one of the
most morally suspect nations in modern history to the poster child of the international
human rights movement." Ronald C. Slye, International Law, Human Rights Beneficiaries,
and South Africa: Some Thoughts on the Utility of International Human Rights Law, 2
Chi.J. Int'l L. 59, 61 (2001). The South African Constitution thus embodies the values of
many modern, late twentieth century constitutions, espousing a commitment to what is
generally called "constitutionalism." See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism,
Democracy, and Foreign Affairs, 67 Ind. L.J. 879, 885-86 (1992) (discussing
constitutionalism as the "commanding ideology of our time"); Louis Henkin, Sibley
Lecture March 1994: Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 Ga.J. Int'l & Comp. L. 31,
31 (1994-1995) (suggesting that half-century of human rights has been both cause and
result of spread of constitutionalism).
77. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, art.
13, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 [hereinafter ICESCR]. For an example of the Court's reliance on the
ICESCR, see Gov't of Rep. of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), paras. 26-29, 45
(citing ICESCR's "significance in understanding the positive obligations created by the
socio-economic rights in the Constitution").
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to the ICESCR to find that the Constitution promises an adequate educa78
tion to promote democratic principles.
Section 28 offers a final argument for requiring an adequate education. It considers children's rights generally and asserts, "A child's best
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the
child." 79 While the Constitution does treat education separately (partially to cover adult education), this clause would seem to further
strengthen a child's right to an adequate education. A plaintiff could
thus argue that failing schools violate not only section 29 (as interpreted
with reference to section 39 values) but also section 28.
B. The Constitutionality of Contemporary South African Education
Having considered the state of current South African education and
ascertained that the Court should read the Constitution to require an
adequate education, we must now determine whether the state of education in South Africa today passes constitutional muster. To do so, we
must first explore other decisions implicating socioeconomic rights and
then consider the right to adequate education in light of those decisions.
Finally, we must look briefly at equality, for while the Court should focus
its attention on issues of educational adequacy, the school system is so
blatantly unequal that the Court might also reference section 9 equality
provisions.
1. Socioeconomic Rights in South AfricanJurisprudence. - South Africa's
Constitution is "the world's leading example of a transformative constitution"; the document is designed to "ensure that future governments do
not fall prey to anything like the evils of the apartheid era,",," and yet
South African courts have struggled to reconcile the document's noble
goals with difficult economic realities. The Constitutional Court's decisions have thus needed to determine exactly what the government is constitutionally obligated to provide. Three decisions that well highlight the
78. South Africa signed the ICESCR on October 3, 1994, but has not yet ratified it.
However, under both the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary
international law, signatories to treaties are bound to refrain from acts that would defeat a
treaty's object and purpose, even if they do not become parties. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Jan. 27, 1980, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336; see also Lori F. Damrosch et
al., International Law: Cases and Materials 109 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that multilateral
treaties can become customary international law binding on nonparties). Moreover, since
South Africa's Constitution requires the Court to consider international law and since the
Court has already referred to the ICESCR in interpreting socioeconomic rights, the
Covenant is clearly relevant in interpreting South Africa's Bill of Rights.
79. S.Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 28(2). See generallyJ. Sloth-Nielsen, The
Child's Right to Social Services, the Right to Social Security, and Primary Prevention of
Child Abuse: Some Conclusions in the Aftermath of Grootboom, 17 S.Afr.J. Hum. Rts. 210
(2001) (exploring Grootboom's effect on socioeconomic rights for children).
80. Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa 4 (Pub.

Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 12, 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.tafabstractid=296657 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Lessons].
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difficulty of this task are Soobramoney v. Minister of Health,"' Government of
Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom,82 and Minister of Health v. Treatment
3
Action Campaign (TAC) .
Soobramoney is the Court's first socioeconomic rights case struggling
to balance rights and resources. Plaintiff-appellant in Soobramoney was a
diabetic suffering from kidney failure who sought to prolong his life
through regular dialysis at a state hospital in Durban. The hospital, however, had only twenty dialysis machines, some of which were in poor condition, and had been unable to provide the appellant with the requested
treatment.8 4 Claiming that his constitutional rights had been violated,
Soobramoney sued, relying on constitutional provisions stipulating that,
"No one may be refused emergency medical treatment."8 5 Justice Arthur
Chaskalson emphasized the significance of this right, writing that a commitment to address the inequalities and injustices left over from
apartheid and "to transform our society into one in which there will be
human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new consti86
tutional order.
However, the Court was also highly aware that limited resources and
great economic disparities make it virtually impossible for the government to provide to its citizens everything that the Constitution promises,
and Chaskalson admitted that "the Department of Health in KwaZuluNatal does not have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the services
which are being provided to the public." 87 Indeed, he cited another section of the Bill of Rights that requires the state to "take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation" of health care rights.88 Since the hospital's resources
were severely limited, it needed to make decisions about how to use its
twenty dialysis machines. The Court concluded that the hospital could
benefit more patients if it continued its present course, providing treatment to patients who might be cured rather than simply maintaining the
sickest in a chronically ill condition.8 9 Since the hospital was already well
over budget, the Court argued that if it were to provide dialysis-and, by
analogy, all life-saving treatment-to all patients in need, "the health
81. 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC).
82. 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
83. 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
84. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA at para. 1.
85. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 27(3). Mr. Soobramoney also invoked the
provision stating, "Everyone has the right to life." Id. § 11. The Court's opinion, however,
focused on the medical treatment issue.
86. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA at para. 8.
87. Id. at para. 24.
88. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 27(2) (emphasis added).
89. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA at para. 25. Argued the Court, "If everyone in the same
condition as the appellant were to be admitted the carefully tailored programme would
collapse and no one would benefit from that." Id. at para. 26.
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budget would have to be dramatically increased to the prejudice of other
needs which the State has to meet."9 °1
The Court thus implied not only that South Africa simply lacked the
resources to provide comprehensive, life-saving health care to all its citizens, but also that the judiciary ought not usurp the legislative function
by implicitly assigning more funds to one important need at the expense
of others. 9 ' To find for Mr. Soobramoney, the Court would have needed
to intervene immediately in the hospital's day-to-day operations, determining what constituted "emergency medical care" as opposed to ongoing treatment. In other words, the Court would not only have needed to
order a particular government agency to do more, but it would have instructed that agency on exactly what to do, thus creating a separation-of92
powers problem that the Court sought to avoid.
Significantly, even though the Court went to great lengths to justify
the policy choice underlying its ruling, it also decided that Mr. Soobramoney's claim did not in fact fall under the Constitution. 93 In finding
that the care sought was ongoing dialysis, the Court concluded that it did
not constitute "emergency medical treatment" and therefore did not
qualify as a constitutionally protected right. 94 The judges were clearly
deeply affected by the moral implications of their decision and explained
carefully that the state simply did not have the funds to provide the plaintiff with continual dialysis treatment.9 5 But however uncomfortable the
Court was denying a dying man the medical services that could prolong
his life, it was not obliged to order a state hospital to do more, because
96
there had been no constitutional violation.
The Constitutional Court confronted a similar issue in Grootboom:
Exactly what government measures were required to satisfy the "progres90. Id. at para. 28.
91. The Court wrote, "The State has to manage its limited resources in order to
address all these claims. There will be times when this requires it to adopt an holistic
approach to the larger needs of society rather than to focus on the specific needs of
particular individuals within society." Id. at para. 31.
92. See id. at para. 29 ("A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken
in good faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to
deal with such matters.").
93. Mr. Soobramoney did not even invoke section 27(2) which reads, "The state must
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the
progressive realisation of [health care] rights." S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 27(2).
The state, in fact, was working towards improving its health care system, and, in any event,
Mr. Soobramoney's medical condition was too dire for "progressive realization" to do him
any good.
94. Soobramoney, 1998 (1) SA at paras. 21, 36.
95. Justice Chaskalson noted with regret "[t] he hard and unpalatable fact is that if the
appellant were a wealthy man he would be able to procure such treatment from private
sources." Id. at para. 31.
96. This point is sometimes obscured by the Court's lengthy dictum about the
difficulty of realizing socioeconomic rights with limited resources. Such a discussion
perhaps suggests that the right not to be refused emergency medical treatment could be
expanded to include ongoing treatment were resources more readily available.
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sive realization" of the constitutionally protected right to housing? Having been evicted from their shanties erected on private land earmarked
for formal low-cost housing, Mrs. Grootboom and other plaintiffs applied
for an order requiring the government to provide them with adequate
basic shelter until they obtained permanent accommodations. The lower
court partially granted the order, requiring the government to provide all
the plaintiffs who were children and their parents with shelter. The government appealed to the Constitutional Court.
Section 26 of the Constitution promises the right to adequate housing.97 The Court accepted that "[t]he State is obliged to take positive
action to meet the needs of those living in extreme conditions of poverty,
homelessness or intolerable housing"; the question was whether the state
had met its obligations."8 Relying on section 26(2), which requires the
state to take "reasonable legislative and other measures,"9 9 the Court
found that the government had not done enough to provide adequate
housing to the plaintiffs. Writing for the Court, Justice Yacoob asserted,
"Mere legislation is not enough.... An otherwise reasonable program
that is not implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with
the State's obligations."10 0
Reasonable measures, therefore, cannot ignore "vulnerable groups,"
the people who most need the Constitution's protection:
The poor are particularly vulnerable and their needs require
special attention .... Those whose needs are the most urgent
and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril,
must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right.... If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs of those most desperate, they
may not pass the test. 10 1
The state, despite its limited resources, needed to do more:
[T]he fact that [the Constitution requires] realisation over time,
or in other words progressively ...should not be misinterpreted
as depriving the obligation of all meaningful content. It is on
the one hand a necessary flexibility device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties involved for any country in ensuring full realization of economic, social and cultural
rights. On the other hand, the phrase must be read in the light
97. Section 26's full text reads:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing.
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right.
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished,
without an order of court made after considering all the relevant
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.
S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 26.
98. Gov't of Rep. of S. Mr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para. 24.
99. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 26(2) (emphasis added).
100. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at para. 42.
101. Id. at paras. 36, 44.
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of the overall objective ... which is to establish clear obligations
for State parties in respect of the full realisation of the rights in
question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously
and effectively as possible towards that goal. 102
"Progressive realisation" of the right, then, means that the state must
take steps to provide adequate housing, which "must be made more accessible not only to a larger number of people but to a wider range of
people as time progresses."""'
Interestingly, the Court chose not to determine the minimum "core
content" of the constitutional right to housing, focusing instead on
whether the government's program was "reasonable," in light of the
poor's particular vulnerability."1 4 In doing so, the Court emphasized the
government's failed efforts to provide the right to the vulnerable, thus
setting for the other governmental branches a high standard it ultimately
found they had failed to meet. It found that section 26 obliges "the State
to devise and implement a coherent, co-ordinated program designed" to
provide adequate housing, and that the existing program had fallen short
102. Id. at para. 45 (internal citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. See id. at paras. 33, 41, 36. Some scholars have argued that the Grootboom Court
ought to have articulated the minimum core content of the right to housing. See, e.g.,
David Bilchitz, Note, Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The Minimum Core and Its
Importance, 119 S. Afr. L.J. 484, 484 (2002) (arguing that "[t]he judgment errs in its
failure to interpret the right of access to adequate housing as including the idea of a
minimum core obligation to provide for basic needs"). It is not easy, however, for courts to
articulate minimum core obligations. First, courts often lack the information needed to
make such determinations. Second, different people need different levels of protection
for a particular socioeconomic right to be meaningful for them. Third, it is unclear if the
minimum core should be defined generally or with regard to specific groups (and, if the
latter, then one could question whether a minimum core in fact exists at all, or is, instead,
mere semantics). Id. at 486-87.
In addition to the practical difficulties of articulating minimum core rights, one might
query just how different such an approach would be from Justice Yacoob's
"reasonableness" and "vulnerable groups" analysis; indeed, both seem particularly
concerned with poor people, since, tinder a minimum core content analysis, the
government will need to provide the indigent with the most to alleviate their need and
meet their core obligations. See id. at 494-99. These approaches are, to be sure, different
doctrinal hooks, but it is unclear how much, if anything, would be gained by requiring the
Court to articulate a right's minimum core content, particularly given the Court's
willingness to define rights by referring to section 39's interpretive instructions. If there is
a significant difference between the two approaches, it could be that the minimum core
content analysis might require judicial intervention even when vulnerable groups' rights
are not at issue. From this perspective, the judiciary might want to steer clear of a
minimum core content so that its ruling does not intrude too much on the legislature's
prerogative. See Sandra Liebenberg, Socio-Economic Rights Project, Community Law
Centre, UWC, South Africa's Evolving Jurisprudence on Socio-Economic Rights 38
(2002), available at http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/docs-2002/evolvingjurisprudence.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting that "advocates of
pro-poor policies . . . articulate a vision of socio-economic rights which goes beyond
government granting relief to those in desperate need, but requires the needs of the poor
to be prioritised in formulating policies and distributing resources.").
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of its obligations. 1° 5 Consequently, the Court issued a declaratory order
requiring the state to act to meet its section 26 obligations by devising,
funding, implementing, and supervising measures to provide housing relief to those in desperate need.' 0 6 The Court thus offered a novel approach to socioeconomic rights, requiring not that the legislature propriorities
vide shelter for everyone, but rather that it adhere to 0sensible
7
with particular attention to the plight of the neediest.
Significantly, Grootboom's holding encroaches less on the legislature
than a pro-plaintiff decision in Soobramoney would have. In fact, it emphasizes that the different "spheres of government" must work "in consultation with each other" to devise a coordinated state housing program.' 0 8
Thus, whereas Mr. Soobramoney would have had the Court determine
for the hospital what constituted emergency care and order it to provide
such treatment immediately, 109 the Grootboom Court is merely telling the
government that it must revise its policy to better address housing for the
poor. Indeed, the Court found that the lower court had erred in ordering the government to provide the plaintiffs shelter or housing immediately because section 26 does not provide for such immediate action. Because the Grootboom Court permitted the state to formulate its plan-and
gave it the time to do so-it avoided the separation-of-powers difficulty
that providing a remedy in Soobramoney would have created.
Another important difference between the two cases is that, unlike
Soobramoney, Grootboom found that the Constitution had in fact been offended: It holds that the government has breached its constitutional obligations for failing to protect a socioeconomic right. While this point is
straightforward, it is, compared to American jurisprudence, remarkable.
Government inaction-or, perhaps more correctly, ineffective and inadequate government action-can itself violate the Constitution, even
though scarce resources might militate against requiring the government
to do more. Wrote Justice Yacoob:
I am conscious that it is an extremely difficult task for the State
to meet these obligations in the conditions that prevail in our
country.... I stress however, that despite all these qualifications,
these are rights, and the Constitution obliges the State to give
effect to them. This is an obligation that Courts can, and in
appropriate circumstances, must enforce. 110
105. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at para. 95. The Court rejected an argument
emphasizing children's rights, choosing instead to focus more broadly on the
reasonableness of the state's provision of the socioeconomic rights.
106. Id. at para. 96.
107. Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do 229 (2001)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Designing Democracy].
108. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at para. 40.
109. Mr. Soobramoney's condition required immediate care. A sad footnote to the
case is that he died two days after the Court's decision. Justice Albie Sachs, Social and
Economic Rights: Can They Be Made Justiciable?, 53 SMU L. Rev. 1381, 1386 (2000).
110. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at para. 94.
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Grootboom thus espouses a vigorous commitment to the judicial vindication of socioeconomic rights, and it is that path the Court recently followed in Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).11 1 The
governmental program at issue provided voluntary HIV counseling and
testing to pregnant women, and Nevirapine' 12 and formula feed for HIVpositive mothers.' 13 The question in this case, the first to challenge a
policy designed exclusively by the ANC regime, was whether it was reasonable for the government to confine the administration of Nevirapine to
research and training sites located in an urban and rural community in
each province, as opposed to in hospitals throughout the nation. 1 4 The
Court, relying on Grootboom, insisted that the state had a "negative obligation" to desist from impairing the right of access to health care services
and that confining the use of Nevirapine to certain hospitals breached
the government's section 27 obligations." 15 Emphasizing the state's constitutional obligations to provide citizens with certain socioeconomic
rights,' 16 it held that the government must make every effort to include
in the program everybody for whom the treatment could combat motherto-child transmission of HIV.' 17
Significantly, the Court once again articulated both "vulnerable
groups" and "separation-of-powers" concerns. Like Grootboom, TAC insists
that the State must take account of differences between "those who can
afford to pay for services and those who cannot."' 8 Thus, in dealing with
the hard questions presented by the case, the Court reminded itself that
"this case concerns particularly those who cannot afford to pay for medical services. To the extent that government limits the supply of
Nevirapine to its research sites, it is the poor outside the catchment areas
of these sites who will suffer."' 19
111. 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC).
112. Nevirapine significantly limits the risk of an HIV-positive mother transmitting the
disease to her fetus or breastfeeding child.
113. TAC, 2002 (5) SA at para. 41. Because Nevirapine was provided for free, the
costs in question were the costs of providing the infrastructure for counseling and testing,
and of providing formula feed and drugs to mothers and children receiving Nevirapine.
Id. at para. 49.
114. Id. at para. 17.
115. Id. at paras. 46, 80. The relevant portions of section 27 state:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to (a) health care services, including reproductive health care;
(b) sufficient food and water ....
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights.
S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 27.
116. TAC, 2002 (5) SA at para. 94.
117. Id. at paras. 95, 125.
118. Id. at para. 70.
119. Id.
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The Court also emphasized that its intrusion into policy-making
must not tread too much on the other governmental branches. Courts, it
noted, are ill-suited to make wide-ranging factual inquiries to determine
minimum core standards. 120 However, the Court insisted that the government nonetheless was obliged to take necessary steps to "respect, protect, promote and fulfil" positive rights 2 and "to take reasonable measures progressively to eliminate or reduce the large areas of severe
deprivation that afflict our society." 122 The Court therefore ruled that
the government had to do more to provide Nevirapine to all in need but
allowed the government to craft the program itself. In permitting the
government to devise a new program within its available resources, 123 the
TAC Court followed Grootboom in vindicating socioeconomic rights for
the socially vulnerable, while at the same time remaining respectful of the
other branches' duties. Our question now is the implications of these
cases for the right to education.
2. The Government's Obligationto ProvideBetter Education. - An education case would fall under Grootboom and TAC, not Soobramoney, because
the Constitution is clearly implicated, because a remedy exists that does
not offend separation-of-powers principles, and because the protected
right specially affects vulnerable groups. Whereas Mr. Soobramoney
sought care beyond what the Constitution promised, plaintiffs in Grootboom and TAC were successful because the government had not provided
reasonable plans to provide their constitutionally protected socioeconomic rights. Education, like access to housing and health care, is a positive socioeconomic right that the state must fulfill,' 2

4

so a failure to pro-

vide it would therefore clearly implicate the Constitution.
Furthermore, just as the Court could instruct the state to do more to
provide housing or HIV treatment for the poor while still affording the
legislature some time and flexibility to determine how, so too could it
order the government to improve schools without itself legislating such
changes immediately. To vindicate education plaintiffs' rights, the Court
need not effect any overnight policy changes of the kind requested in
Soobramoney. The Court can thus continue its strategy of protecting socioeconomic rights for the poor without unacceptably usurping the other
125
branches' managerial role.
120. Id. at paras. 37-38. See also supra note 104.
121. Id. at para. 39 (quoting S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 7(2)).
122. Id. at para. 36.
123. Id. at para. 135. Note that whereas Mr. Soobramoney was litigating his right to
receive emergency medical treatment, the plaintiffs in TAC sued for their right to health
care services, which the government must achieve progressively. The two decisions are
therefore not incompatible, since the former finds that the treatment sought was in fact
not emergency, while the latter determines that the government does need to do more to
make health care services more available.
124. See id. at para. 100 (insisting that state has positive obligation to protect
socioeconomic rights).
125. See Sunstein, Designing Democracy, supra note 107, at 222.
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Finally,just as Grootboom and TAC emphasized the fact that the plaintiffs were members of vulnerable groups whose interests were of particular governmental concern, so too could an education case seek to improve the country's worst schools. Interestingly, even though Mr.
Soobramoney was certainly "vulnerable" as an indigent diabetic, one can
argue that such a case should not trigger vulnerable groups analysis, because he was seeking a specific remedy for only himself, as opposed to a
broader plan to address a socioeconomic right denied to many "vulnerable" people. In this way, an education-rights case also would resemble
Grootboom and TAC more than Soobramoney. Therefore, given South African education inadequacies, the Constitutional Court should draw on
Grootboom and TAC to argue that current educational conditions in the
worst schools violate the Constitution and that the government is obliged
to do more to provide vulnerable groups with a better education. While
South Africa may not have the resources to implement a school system
equivalent to the world's wealthiest nations, the Court can still emphasize
that current education in the poorest South African schools does not provide a foundation for ongoing personal development, civic activity, and
2 6
employment.
The government's best counterargument is probably not that the
worst schools pass muster, but rather that under the section 36 Limitations Clause the government need not allocate resources it does not
have. 127 Here the Limitations Clause might allow the government to justify a limitation on education spending that under section 29 would be
prima facie unconstitutional, if that limitation served a pressing public
interest.' 28 In other words, though section 29(a) treats basic education as
a strong positive right, the government might not have an absolute obligation to provide it, if it can point to a compelling government reason
29
not to do so, such as severe budget problems.'
126. See Chaskalson et al., supra note 61, at 38-3 (suggesting that courts judge basic
education by reference to these civic norms); see also infra Part III.
127. Section 36 reads:
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an
open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom,
taking into account all relevant factors, including-

(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its ptrpose; and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the
Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.
S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 36.
128. Chaskalson et al., supra note 61, at 12-47.
129. Id. at 38-1.
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Significantly, in Grootboom the Constitutional Court made no reference to section 36 limitations. 130 While Grootboom's failure to mention
section 36 does not, of course, render that clause irrelevant, it suggests
that limitations are not at the center of constitutional interpretation of
socioeconomic rights. The Court certainly must consider the government's budgetary constraints when determining whether its programs are
constitutional, but, to the extent Grootboom provides guidance, if the "nature of the right" 131 is important enough to a democratic society based
on freedom and equality, it will probably outweigh most limitations on
that right.1 32 Thus, if the right is deemed crucial, it will tighten the limi1 33
tation requirements that follow.
That Grootboom implicitly considers housing to be such a crucial
right-so crucial in fact that the Court did not even engage in a limitations analysis-suggests that basic education would also be one. The
Constitution creates basic education as a strong positive right without reference to governmental resources. Housing, by way of contrast, is a weak
positive right that requires the government to take "reasonable" measures
"within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of
this right. 1 3 4 Since the Court did not feel compelled to undergo a limitations inquiry for a weak positive right in Grootboom, it follows that it
would also not limit the right to basic education, a strong positive right,
13 5
even if the costs incurred were high.
130. See Gov't of Rep. of S. Mr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
131. S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 36(1)(a).
132. See, e.g., S v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (holding that applicant's right
to life was so crucial that it outweighed any interest government had in the death penalty).
133. Chaskalson et al., supra note 61, at 12-50. The Court is conducting a sort of
balancing test here, indeed the only "real" balancing test undertaken in South African
jurisprudence. Id. at 12-51. But see id. at 12-56 (arguing that though it happens,
balancing constitutional rights can be confusing and, at times, impossible). To the extent,
though, that the limitations will shrink if the right is an important one, it may be useful to
think of rights as "trumps" here (though, given the existence of the Limitations Clause,
probably not as absolute trumps in Dworkin's sense). If the right is crucial enough, it will
almost certainly "trump" the limitation. See generally Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously (1978) (arguing that political theory must take rights more seriously than it does
and that rights derive not merely from political decisions and social practices).
134. S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 26(2).
135. See Chaskalson et al., supra note 61, at 41-49 (arguing that fact that fulfillment of
right will require substantial resources is not itself sufficient reason to limit right, because,
if so, this approach would defeat purpose of including socioeconomic rights in Bill of
Rights).
Note that one possible explanation for Grootboom's failure to engage in a section 36
analysis is that, unlike section 29, section 26 includes an internal limitation so that an
external section 36 limitations analysis would be redundant. See id. at 41-48 (discussing
application of limitations inquiry). However, even if this is the case, it would not make
sense for the external section 36 limitations inquiry to be more rigorous than an internal
limitations inquiry such as section 26. Clearly the framers chose to create some strong
positive rights like education and some weak positive rights like housing. They created
general section 36 limitations, because they realized that socioeconomic rights could not
be provided immediately, absolutely, and completely, but they could not have intended for
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After disposing of the limitation analysis1 36 (or ignoring it, as it did
in Grootboom), the Court will still need to determine whether the Constitution compels the government to do more to provide adequate basic and
further education. Basic education presents the easier case. Section
29(1) (a) creates basic education as a strong positive right containing
none of the limitations that apply to health care or housing.1 3 7 As a matter of grammatical and constitutional interpretation, section 29(1)
strongly suggests that the government has an absolute duty to provide
basic education. 38 Whereas the state only has to make further education
"progressively available and accessible" "through reasonable measures,"
no such clause limits the obligation to provide basic education. 139 Given
it to place as strong a limitation as internal limitations clauses, because if they had, they
would not have chosen to make some positive rights strong and others weak. Thus, even if
a section 36 analysis applies here but not in Grootboom, the rigor of that limitations analysis
must be lower than in that case. Since limitations proved not to be an obstacle in
Grootboom, as a matter of logic, it should also not be one here since the state in both cases is
depriving people of their constitutional socioeconomic rights.
136. The Court might also argue that recent budget cuts were unnecessary, that while
fiscal discipline is an important state objective, it cannot be pursued without regard to the
state's constitutional obligation to provide certain socioeconomic rights. Under this line of
reasoning, the country's budget problems might not even trigger the Limitations Clause.
137. See supra notes 60-66, 93, 102-105 and accompanying text.
138. Section 29(1) reads:
(1) Everyone has the right (a) to a basic education, including adult basic education; and
(b) to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures,
must make progressively available and accessible.
S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 29(1).
139. A counterargument to this interpretation might be that the qualifying clause in
section 29(1)(b) ("which the state, through reasonable measures, must make progressively
available and accessible") modifies not only "further education" but also "basic education."
Under such a reading, the state would not be required to provide basic education
immediately, but rather demonstrate that it was taking active steps to provide it
"progressively." It would then only be violating its constitutional duties if the Court found,
as it did in Grootboom, that its programs were not doing enough to improve the situation.
Such a reading, however, is unpersuasive. The limiting clause is attached only to
"further education," and is separated from "basic education" by both a semicolon and a
conjunction ("and"). Grammatically, it seems a stretch to apply the clause to "basic
education." Moreover, if we compare section 29 (education) to section 26 (housing), we
see that section 26(2) explicitly states that the government "must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive
realisation of this right." S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 26(2). In other words, while
the right promised in section 26(l)-the right to have access to adequate housingappears absolute if read independently, the Constitution explicitly attaches to it section
26(2), which stipulates that the government can only be expected to take "reasonable"
measures "within its available resources" to achieve the "progressive" realization of the
right. See supra note 97 for full text of section 26. That the Court in Grootboom held that
the lower court had erred in ordering the government to provide immediate housing to
the plaintiffs confirms this reading.
By way of contrast, section 29(1) (b)'s limitations contain no such explicit reference to
section 29(1)(a); unlike section 26, there is no clear indication in section 29(1) that the
state need only make basic education "progressively available" using "reasonable
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the Constitution's adequate education requirement and the poor conditions of many schools, the Court should therefore hold that the government needs to provide better basic education immediately, regardless of
1 40
its other budgetary concerns.
While further education is not as easy a case as basic education, it fits
within Grootboom and TAC's analysis; further education is a right the
Court can require be made progressively more available without interfering in day-to-day bureaucratic decisions. Grootboom's test to determine
whether the government has fulfilled its positive obligations to provide
and protect socioeconomic rights is whether the measures adopted are
"reasonable" given the needs of those whose rights are "most in peril." 14 1
Given the Court's reasoning in Grootboom and the similarity between the
country's substandard housing and school conditions, the Court should
determine that the state has not taken reasonable measures to provide
further education. 14 2 Indeed, section 29(1) (b) offers even more textual
measures." Had the framers intended the state only to make basic education "progressively
available" "within its available resources," they surely would have phrased section 29
differently. They either could have included a whole separate subsection qualifying the
entire right, as they did in section 26, or they could have tinkered with their punctuation
and grammar to link the qualifying clause in section 29(1)(b) to the right in section
29(1) (a). That they did neither strongly suggests their intention to make "basic education"
an absolute right that government must provide immediately.
140. Given the absolute terms of section 29(1)(a), the findings detailed in Parts Iand
ILA, and the definition of adequacy given in Part III, this conclusion comes easily. To the
extent skeptics find this reasoning unsatisfactory, however, the arguments that the Court
should require the government to do more to provide further education also apply to basic
education. As Part I demonstrates, both basic (pre-school to ninth grade) and further
(tenth grade and beyond) education are far from adequate. Since the bar for finding
current conditions unconstitutional for further education is higher than for basic
education, the constitutional arguments asserting that further education is inadequate
serve as additional, but probably unnecessary, arguments that the country's basic
education is unconstitutional.
141. Gov't of Rep. of S. Mr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), at paras. 41, 44; see
Sandra Liebenberg, The Right to Social Assistance: The Implications of Grootboom for
Policy Reform in South Africa, 17 S. Afr.J. Hum. Rts. 232, 241 (2001) (discussing Grootboom
in context of social assistance); see also Pierre De Vos, Grootboom, the Right of Access to
Housing and Substantive Equality as Contextual Fairness, 17 S. Mr. J. Hum. Rts. 258,
268-76 (2001) (discussing Grootboom in context of substantive equality).
142. South African housing and education conditions seem comparable for the
poorest segment of the population in that neither fulfill the obligations of section 39 of the
Bill of Rights. Just as shanties or, indeed, no housing at all, fail to promote "human
dignity," so too does a school system in which only twenty percent of blacks reach the last
year of high school fail to promote "equality and freedom." See supra Part I for other
examples of educational shortcomings. Of course, section 39's standards are necessarily
subjective, but a system in which so many people's most basic needs are neglected seems
necessarily contrary to the "values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity." S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 39(1)(a). Note that this approach
asks, as Grootboom did, what quality of education is reasonable in light of the inequalities
already facing South Africa's poor. To pass constitutional muster, then, education must
conform with section 39's standards, which might fluctuate as the country changes. Unlike
a minimum core content analysis, see supra note 104 and accompanying text, this

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 103:614

support for further education than section 26 does for housing. Whereas
section 26 requires the government to take "reasonable legislative and
other measures, within its available resources" to "achieve the progressive
realisation" of access to adequate housing, 143 section 29(1)(b) offers
fewer qualifications to the right to further education. Section 29 nowhere mentions "available resources," thus suggesting that the state must
make further education progressively available, even if it lacks the resources to do so.144 This omission suggests that education-including
further education-is among the very highest state priorities, to be real1 45
ized even when resources are at their scarcest.
3. Equal Protection. - While the Court should focus on the right to
education in section 29,146 the current state of South African education
also violates the Constitution's guarantees of equal protection. Section 9
of the Bill of Rights states that "[e]veryone is equal before the law and has
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law" 14 7 and that
"[e]quality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken."' 4s Since
"[n]ational legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair disadequacy analysis does not set in stone particular requirements, but rather allows the
courts to determine what seems "reasonable" given the country's circumstances and, more
importantly, gives the legislature the leeway to play a major role in fashioning a
constitutionally acceptable remedy.
143. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 26(2).
144. Obviously, a state cannot spend resources it does not actually have. However, the
Constitution's language suggests that the Court still ought to uphold the importance of the
right and urge the government to do more. See infra Part II.C.
145. From a functionalist standpoint, this conclusion may well make sense since
improved education will help the nation achieve its other goals. See infra Parts I.C & Ill.
Some might argue that this kind of close textual interpretation ought to be
accompanied by an originalist argument; after all, some (though not all) proponents of
close textual readings of the American Constitution insist that their readings are also
rooted in originalist understandings. However, unlike the U.S. Constitution, the South
African Constitution contains clauses guiding constitutional interpretation. Section 39
requires courts to "promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based
on human dignity, equality and freedom" when interpreting the Bill of Rights. S. Afr.
Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 39(1)(a). An interpreter of the South African Constitution,
particularly the Bill of Rights, thus has the luxury of having the framers' intent built into
the document itself.
146. Though this Note argues here that the Court should not ignore section 9
equality issues, it believes the analysis should focus on the adequacy, rather than the
equality, of the education. Equal education does not necessarily mean adequate
education. Predominantly black schools might be "equal" to predominantly white schools,
but if neither of those schools offers decent educations, then the victory is a hollow one.
The Court should refer to inequalities to highlight the worst schools' inadequacies, but it
should remember that merely making white and black schools equal will not necessarily
satisfy the standards of section 29.
147. S.Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 9(1).
148. Id. § 9(2).
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crimination,"' 14 9 the Court should recognize that the government's failure to take stronger steps to remedy educational inequities constitutes a
violation of section 9.
One advantage of this argument is that it is easier to prove inequality
than inadequacy. Inadequacy is often subjective, relying on general standards. While the democratic principles set out in section 39 provide the
foundation for a definition of adequacy, 15 0 reasonable people could differ over the finer points of that definition. Inequality, by way of contrast,
is easier to establish. 15 1 That a predominantly black province has twice as
high a pupil-to-teacher ratio as a predominantly white province is clear

evidence of inequality.' 5

2

Similarly, the startling differences between fa-

cilities also highlight gross inequities. 53 Indeed, some have argued that
school fees themselves violate section 9, because schools in wealthy districts that are able to collect higher tuition can spend far more money per
learner. 154
Moreover, an equal protection analysis well suits South Africa's contemporary concerns. Equality ranks high on the "rainbow nation's" list of
goals; the Constitution itself instructs judges to interpret it to further
equality. The Court's own "vulnerable groups" analysis in Grootboom and
TAC, while not explicitly resting on equal protection grounds, certainly is
sensitive to these values. Indeed, following this approach, one could argue that poor schools should in fact receive more resources to give them
a chance to catch up to the wealthier ones. Because the inequity in South
African schools today is not merely due to funding differences but to the
lingering effects of apartheid's systemic biases, equality may be impossible
55
without these more radical measures. 1
149. Id. § 9(4).
150. See infra Part III.
151. Unlike U.S. federal constitutional law, for example, Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), the South African Constitution does not require plaintiffs to prove
government intent to establish an equal protection violation. See S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill
of Rights), § 9(4).
152. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text; see also Bel Porto School
Governing Body v. Premier of W. Cape Province, 2002 (3) SA 265 (CC) (finding that white
disabled schools were not worse off than other disabled schools, and that redeployment
scheme intended to benefit understaffed schools therefore did not unfairly discriminate
against them).
154. See Roithmayr, Constitutionality of School Fees, supra note 19.
155. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (explaining why black schools
remain so inferior to white ones and suggesting that poorer schools can only catch up if
they are given more money than richer ones). Of course, merely providing poorer schools
with increased funding will not alone solve the problem; those schools also need to learn
to manage those resources efficiently and to adopt strategies to teach disadvantaged
students. See generally L. Crouch & T. Mabogoane, When the Residuals Matter More than
the Coefficients: An Educational Perspective,J. Stud. Econ. & Econometrics, Aug. 1998, at
1; Luis Crouch & Thabo Mabogoane, No Magic Bullets, Just Tracer Bullets: The Role of
Learning Resources, Social Advantage, and Education Management in Improving the
Performance of South African Schools 2 (Apr. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
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C. The Tension Between Aspirations and Realities
Of course, it is easier to proclaim constitutional ideals than to realize
them. Even were the Court to require that government do more to provide adequate education, there is no guarantee that the legislature would
or could satisfy that requirement. Some might argue that to announce
standards that cannot be met would ultimately cheapen the Constitution;
the Court can preach whatever message it wants, but that message-and
the Constitution itself-will ring hollow once people begin to realize that
its rulings do not improve their everyday lives. A narrow constitution,
goes the argument, is better than an empty one.
Neither the Court nor the Constitution itself is blind to these pressures. The Bill of Rights, as previously noted, contains a Limitations
Clause that implies that socioeconomic rights at times must be limited
due to budget shortcomings. 1 56 Similarly, the Court has identified this
difficulty both implicitly and explicitly. In Soobramoney, Justice Chaskalson, before ultimately denying the plaintiff relief, wrote:
We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth.
Millions of people are living in deplorable conditions and in
great poverty. There is a high level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have access to clean water
or to adequate health services. These conditions already existed
when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to address them, and to transform our society into one in which there
will be human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of
our new constitutional order. For as long as these conditions
15 7
continue to exist that aspiration will have a hollow ring.
The Grootboom Court, though arriving at a different holding, wrestles
with the same issue. It opens with the admission that the case "grapples
with the realisation of these aspirations" of human dignity, equality, and
the advancement of human rights and freedoms.1 58 "The case," it writes,
"brings home the harsh reality that the Constitution's promise of dignity
and equality for all remains for many a distant dream."1 59
with the Columbia Law Review) (attempting to assess impact that financial resources,
management, and "contextual poverty" have on educational performance in South African
schools).
Sen has argued that people's freedom grows out of their "capability," their ability to
live comfortably and pursue their life goals. Sen, supra note 73, at 75. Poverty, of course,
diminishes people's capabilities, id. at 87-110, so that "the substantive freedoms that we
respectively enjoy . .. are extremely contingent on personal, social, and environmental
circumstances." Id. at 283-84. To the extent that improved education can help improve
people's capabilities, more equal education could be an important vehicle to help many
South Africans find the freedom they have lacked for so long.
156. See S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 36 (considering limiting factors).
157. Soobramoney v. Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal), 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC),
para. 8; see also supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Soobramoney).
158. Gov't of Rep. of S. Afr. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para. 1; see also
supra Part II.B.] (discussing Grootboom).
159. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA at para. 2.
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However, while the Court has identified this tension in both cases, it
has yet to articulate a rigorous rationale for why the judiciary should protect socioeconomic rights even when resources are scarce. Soobramoney,
Crootboom, and TAC do not claim to be the Court's final or definitive
statement on these matters. This should be no surprise; the problem is
an intractable one, and no solution is wholly satisfactory. And yet, while
the difficulties of economic conditions should in no way be minimized,
there are important arguments for why the Court should insist upon the
realization of an adequate education as a fundamental right, even if the
government's capacity to deliver significantly improved schools is
questionable.
For one, as the primary interpreter of the Constitution, the Court
finds itself in the best position to reaffirm the country's commitment to
equality and dignity for all. In a country where so many people lived
under oppression for so long, popular constitutionalism is hard to come
by.' 60 Socioeconomic improvements, to be sure, will be crucial to South
Africa's future, but it is also important that people do not lose their commitment to the Constitution's ideals. While some black South Africans
are economically better off now than they were in 1994, for many others
the absence of apartheid's oppression and the constitutional commitment to human dignity is the major difference in their lives.
These ideals are certainly not enough, and commentators would be
foolish to believe that these improvements are themselves a completed
victory. But if championing these rights without realizing them risks
emptying the Constitution, then abandoning them altogether would
surely drain out even more of its content. In fact, as one commentator
notes, the risk has always existed that "the Constitutional Court would
become the preserve of the wealthy," the place where the wealthy white,
robbed of its monopoly of the legislature and bureaucracy, would "use its
affluence to monopolise the law." 16 1 To abandon the Bill of Rights' commitment to socioeconomic rights so early in South Africa's ambitious con160. This is not to say that citizens lack political consciousness. However, many
people who once vigorously opposed apartheid are now less politically active, less attuned
to the day-to-day workings of the government. Instead, they harbor a vague grudge that
the government has forgotten them. See, e.g., Lester Venter, When Mandela Goes: The
Coming of South Africa's Second Revolution 169-86 (1997) (discussing difficulty of
reforming masses' political concerns).
161. Johnny Steinberg, Court Sparks Revolution or Does It?, Bus. Day
(Johannesburg), Oct. 10, 2000, at 11, available at http://www.bday.co.za/bday/content/
direct/0,3523,717355-6078-0,00.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also
Shedrack C. Agbakwa, Reclaiming Humanity: Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as the
Cornerstone of African Human Rights, 5 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 177, 177 (2002)
(contending that economic, social, and cultural rights are key to effectively realizing
human rights in Africa). Others have suggested that the current Constitutional Court,
many of whose members were themselves once human rights advocates, will prove to be
the high watermark of rights-based jurisprudence. E.g., Steve Kahanovitz, Legal Director,
Legal Resources Centre, The Changing Nature of Public Interest Law in South Africa,
Remarks at Columbia Law School (Oct. 17, 2002). If the future does in fact bring more
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stitutional experiment would exacerbate that risk. It would also relieve
the government of any obligation to provide for the destitute masses still
suffering from apartheid's lingering effects. The Constitution, after all,
not only establishes these rights but empowers the Court to "grant appropriate relief" 62 and to declare when the government has acted unconstitutionally. 163 Stated bluntly, to insist upon the right to an adequate education risks making an empty pronouncement, but to refuse to do so
guarantees that the Constitution will become a mere shell of itself.
Indeed, in addition to protecting educational rights, the Court can
continue a novel and important process of redefining thejudiciary's role
in a democracy so that courts can insist upon defining crucial rights while
still leaving implementation to the other branches. The South African
Constitutional Court has begun to stake out new ground for itself, and
further decisions on socioeconomic rights could go a long way towards
preserving the progress it has made. Thus can the Court remain "respectful of democratic prerogatives and of the limited nature of public resources, while also requiring special deliberative attention to those whose
minimal needs are not being met."' 6 4 Indeed, by following its Grootboom
and TAC decisions, the Constitutional Court can continue a process that
Cass Sunstein argues "for the first time in... history" seeks to ensure the
protection of human rights "without placing courts in an unacceptable
15
managerial role."'
It is also important to remember that government implementation
of any Court order need not happen overnight. Even though section
29(1) suggests that a basic education needs to be made available immediately (as opposed to further education, which need only be made "progressively available and accessible"),1 6 6 difficult economic realities make
immediate vast improvements unrealistic. Indeed, judicial precedent is
sensitive to this problem; Grootboom reversed the lower court's holding
that the government needed to provide plaintiffs with housing "immediately upon demand."'"67 The Court's task is then to find that middle
ground between creation of a fully enforceable right, on the one hand,
and the conclusion of complete nonjusticiability, on the other. This is,
admittedly, an unfamiliar approach in most constitutional law, but its requirement of "reasoned judgment, including reasonable priority-setting,"' 168 is precisely the sensible path, respectful of democratic prerogaexecutive and commercially minded decisions, one could argue that building precedent
protecting socioeconomic rights now is particularly important.
162. S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 38.
163. S. Ar. Const. ch. 8 (Courts and Administration of Justice), § 172(1).
164. Sunstein, Lessons, supra note 80, at 1.
165. Id.
166. See supra Part II.B.2.
167. Gov't of Rep. of S. Ar. v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), para. 95.
168. Sunstein, Lessons, supra note 80, at 12. Sunstein argues that the South African
Constitutional Court in Grootboom adopted an "administrative law model of socio-economic
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ives and of the limited nature of public resources, while also remaining
attentive to the needs of society's most vulnerable. 169
The Court must recognize that the government cannot make all necessary changes at once, but a decision reaffirming the significance of education in South Africa's Constitution nevertheless would likely prompt
some change. Following Grootboom, the state began "the struggle to effectively implement the norms" articulated in the Court's decision. 70 Local
governments, in particular, were forced to recognize that they risked violating the Bill of Rights if they did not meet the short-term needs of the
most disadvantaged. 17 Because the Grootboom and TAC cases were so recent (October 2000 and July 2002), it is too early to know whether the
172
government will be able to implement these decisions successfully.
What is clear, though, is that both local and federal governments have
taken steps to comply with the decisions. An education ruling could
spark similar government action, catalyzing, one hopes, a process of gradual reforms and improved collaboration between different branches and
levels of government.1 7 A Court decision could thus push the government branches to go further. Indeed, to the extent that government corruption and bureaucratic inertia-and not just limited resources-contribute to the problem, a judicial ruling can also put the government's
1 74
shortcomings in the spotlight.
rights... call[ing] for ...some sort of reasonable plan, designed to ensure that relief will
be forthcoming to a significant percentage of poor people." Id. at 13.
169. Sunstein, Designing Democracy, supra note 107, at 221-22.
170. UN Working Group on the Right to Development, Case Study: South Africa
(Sept. 2000), at http://www.fiop.org/reports/rtd/safrica.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
171. From the Courts: Grootboom v. Oostenberg Municipality, Local Government
Law Bulletin (Apr. 2001), at http://www.sn.apc.org/users/clc/localgovt/bulletin/
01(1)frclb.htm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
172. The Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School
of Government has begun a study of the aftermath of Grootboom to uncover what the
decision actually means to the community and government housing authorities. The
results at this early stage, however, are inconclusive. See Carr Center for Human Rights
Policy, Case Studies: Housing Rights in South Africa, at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/
cchrp/cstudies.shtml (last modified Mar. 4, 2003) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(discussing study). Obviously, TAC is far too recent for a study of its effects to be
worthwhile.
173. American school reform, for instance, has brought some encouraging new forms
of "collaboration between courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies ... and between
these organs of government and new forms of public action .... It thus redefines the
separation of powers, and recasts the administrative state more generally, while opening
the way to new forms of citizen participation in the orientation and operation of key public
institutions." James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform 4 (Oct. 2002),
available at http://www.law.Columbia.edu/sabel/papers.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
174. In the realm of education, for instance, schools have proven to be negligent in
collecting textbooks from students at the end the school year. As a result, the education
system has been losing more than R300,000 a year, arguably enough to provide 100 new
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In addition to reaffirming its new role and encouraging legislative
reform, a judicial opinion would also help galvanize public opinion.
There is among the poor in South Africa a lingering malcontentedness,
but not a strong sense of how to make the situation better.175 Grootboom
and TAC's policy implications may not yet be known, but they thrust
housing and AIDS issues into the forefront of the nation's consciousness.
In a country where so many people are uneducated-and therefore arguably less attuned to the opportunities afforded by a good education-a
decision calling attention to educational rights might well help people
recognize that it is in their own interests to work towards improved
schools. Significantly, these efforts could be directed at more than just
government reform, though it is ultimately the legislature that must provide the infrastructure and resources to make schools work. Communities could stress education more vigorously; parents could center their
children's lives more around their school obligations. Law, thus, can not
only be shaped by public opinion but can itself influence changes in public attitude. ' 7 6 By affirming the significance of the right to education, the
Constitutional Court could spur government reform and a popular sentiment in favor of better schools.

schools every year. Independent Online, Textbook losses = 100 new schools a year, Mar. 4,
2003, at http://www.iol.co.za/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Courts might want
to use such disheartening trends both to justify their own involvement and to call attention
to the disparity between legislative norms and street-level implementation. The Grootboom
court used this approach when it emphasized that it was the government's implementation of
the legislative program that had been unreasonable. Gov't of Rep. of S. Afr. v. Grootboom,
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), at para. 42. Thus can the Court emphasize that constitutionally
adequate legislative policy does not necessarily translate into constitutionally adequate
implementation. See also supra Part ll.B.1.
The significance of this power is not to be underestimated in a country where the
media's credibility is frequently under fire. The press, to be sure, can be quite critical of
the government, but government officials, in return, aggressively try to manipulate and
discredit hostile media. See, e.g., Sechaba ka'Nkosi, ANC Meddles in News Reports, Mail
& Guardian (S. Afr.), Apr. 24-May 1, 1998, at 13 (describing government's various means
of punishing journalists who publish negative stories). The Justices on the Constitutional
Court, however, are more generally respected; a ruling from them is worth far more than
dozens of newspaper editorials and is therefore the country's best chance of calling
popular attention to ineffective bureaucracy.
175. See, e.g., Venter, supra note 160, at 167-201 (exploring poor people's attitudes
in South Africa).
176. William Eskridge eloquently makes this point in the context of Vermont's same
sex domestic partnership rights. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Equality Practice: Liberal
Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 Alb. L. Rev. 853, 877 (2001) (arguing
that "law cannot liberalize unless public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be
influenced by changes in the law"). Obviously, there are far more differences than
similarities between education rights in South Africa and gay rights in Vermont.
Nevertheless, the basic point is that law, particularly when proffered by the moral authority
ofjudges, can shape public attitudes. See also Sunstein, Designing Democracy, supra note
107, at 235 (arguing that judicial guarantees of socioeconomic rights can direct "political
attention to interests that would otherwise be disregarded in ordinary political life").
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Moreover, the Court should keep in mind that a decision would not
only affect South Africa today but likely would have ramifications for generations to come. It is important that the Court not sever links with the
Constitution's ideological commitment to socioeconomic rights. Assuming that South Africa's economy will continue to grow, 17 7 the country's
ability to meet fully its constitutional obligations will improve. A decision
refusing to realize a constitutionally protected right would serve as an
unsettling precedent and might in fact strip the Bill of Rights-not just
the Education Clause-of most of its content. Indeed, while a pro-education decision today could force the government to do more now, it also
will require the state to make education progressively better as the country's resources improve. Alternatively, bowing to current financial pressures might freeze future courts' ability to defend education and, potentially, other socioeconomic rights.1 78 Allowing the Constitution's ideals
to stagnate seems far less desirable than issuing a decision with which the
state can only partially comply.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, beyond the general arguments defending what skeptics might call an "aspirational" ruling, education serves as the foundation of much of what South Africa wants to accomplish. 179 Because social problems tend to be interconnected,
reformers ought to ask which issues underlie others and address those
problems that might also benefit other areas. Under this theory, when
resources are limited, the rights government should first protect are
those that will help achieve other goals.' 80 In this way, reform does not
177. An interesting and troubling question is how the Court should handle these
issues if the country's economic conditions worsen.

To an extent, the Court could

continue to assert the importance of the right, recognizing that the state's compliance will
be limited by fiscal difficulties. Indeed, such a decision would not be inconsistent with
Grootboom, which insists that the legislature do more, but leaves it up to that branch to
decide exactly how to do it. However, such a decision could also emphasize the need for
more effective government (i.e., less corruption) and more equal distribution of resources.
In this way, the Court could continue to respect the Constitution's commitment to
socioeconomic rights while remaining sensitive to current conditions (and potentially
spurring a grassroots movement committed, say, to improved education or to reducing
government corruption).
178. Interestingly, future South African courts are not the only judicial bodies that
might be affected by this decision. South Africa's Constitution has received considerable
attention worldwide, and its commitment to socioeconomic rights serves as an
inspiration-and a basis for comparison-in other countries. See, e.g., Balakrishnan
Rajagopal, The Supreme Court & human rights, The Hindu (India), Dec. 6, 2000,
available at http://www.hinduonnet.com/thehindu/2001/12/06/stories/05062524.htm
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (comparing Indian Supreme Court decision on
human rights with Grootboom and citing Grootboom as emblematic of "contemporary global
trends and standards").
179. See infra Part III.
180. Of course, one difficulty here is that many different social goals are
interconnected. One could certainly argue, for instance, that people will have difficulty
bettering their lot in life without the stability of adequate housing. Education, though,
seems particularly foundational. See infra Part III.
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necessarily trade one good for another, but rather can tackle multiple
problems simultaneously.18' Indeed, one school of thought even argues
that the economy-the chief concern driving the reduced budget in education and other social services 1 2-would in fact grow more if resources
today were turned towards "expansionary fiscal policy" that increased
people's potential by providing them with the skills needed to compete in
the workplace. 18 3 Thus might many of South Africa's problems be more
easily addressed if the populace were better educated and possessed the
"capability" to help itself.I' 4
The AIDS crisis presents an important, if unique, example of how
improved education might address other social problems. Experts estimate that by 2011, over half the South African population will live in
households affected by at least one HIV/AIDS infection.18 5 The poverty
implications, already apparent, could dramatically increase health care
costs and decrease economic productivity due to ill or deceased workers
or household members tending to ill family members. 8 6 In short, AIDS
in South Africa is a crisis.
Obviously, drug treatment is essential for those already infected, and
a host of political, economic, and legal issues (particularly debates over
intellectual property laws) surround that problem. However, educating
people, particularly children and teenagers, about the dangers of AIDS
and ways to guard against them, will also need to play a large role in
Africa's desperate struggle against the disease. Sex and death are taboo
topics in much of African society, so communities have been reluctant to
begin dealing with the AIDS crisis. 18 7 Because so many myths surround
the disease, 188 it is probably unsurprising that the number of infections
have risen at an alarming rate over the past decade. Countering these
181. Because so many social problems are not isolated, institutions seeking social
change are perhaps most effective when they seek to address interrelated problems. See,
e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent
Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 873 (2000) (exploring how drug
treatment and job training-policy issues outside the criminal justice system-can work
with, not against, drug courts so that government does not need to trade off between
employment policy and drug policy). See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 ColIm. L. Rev. 267 (1998) (proposing
system of democratic experimentalism which permits citizens to use local knowledge to fit
given circumstances, while encouraging national coordinating bodies to pool information
resources and thereby increase efficiency, encourage mutual learning, and heighten
accountability).
182. See supra Part I (discussing policy of fiscal discipline).
183. E.g., Nicolaou, supra note 16, at 90.
184. See supra note 155 (discussing how improved education can increase freedom as
conceptualized by Sen).
185. Liebenberg, supra note 141, at 235.
186. Id.; In Mandela's Shadow, Economist, Dec. 14, 2002, at 23, 23.
187. Southern Africa's Unmentionable Cure, Economist, July 5, 1997, at 47, 47.
188. Many Africans refuse to believe that sexual intercourse can spread a disease.
Some believe, in fact, that infected men can cure themselves of the illness by having sex
with a virgin. Id.
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myths is no small task, but schools could potentially play a large role in
doing so.' 8 9 In fact, encouraging schools to tackle a tangible problem
like a nationwide health crisis might help convince the population that
improved education is in fact something from which everyone will benefit. 190 Admittedly, improved AIDS education would not necessarily improve education generally. However, the mere strategy of using schools
to educate the population about an urgent matter might encourage the
state to provide schools with more resources and might also help inculcate a commitment to education.
Improved education might also help address other problems. South
Africa has one of the world's highest crime rates, 19 1 in part because many
see little opportunity for economic gain outside a life of crime. Education can help expand people's horizons and, hopefully, guide some potential criminals to real professions. Reduced crime rates could, in turn,
help attract international investments, one of President Mbeki's strategies
for improving the economy. 19 2 A more educated, skilled workforce
might also attract such investment. Education can thus address a host of
national concerns, including the very economic issues that counsel
against extending government resources to pay for better schools.
There are, of course, no easy fixes. Lackluster schools will not be
turned around overnight, and even tangible improvements will not necessarily translate immediately into other social spheres. Indeed, while there
is certainly reason to believe that improved schools can help South Africa
attack AIDS, crime, and economic woes, it would be naive to assume that
better schools would accomplish such objectives quickly. A more skilled
workforce, for instance, will not, on its own, create betterjobs. However,
189. This is particularly true in urban squatter camps, many of which lack any
community meeting place other than schools. Rootless, most squatter camp residents
come from afar and hope to settle there only temporarily. The result is that these places
lack any sense of community, a phenomenon that makes educating the populace about the
dangers of AIDS even more difficult.
In fact, one could argue that educating children and teenagers about AIDS prevention
is not only a wise but a constitutionally required measure. Section 27 of the Constitution
requires the state to take "reasonable legislative and other measures" to provide access to
health care. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 27(2). Not only could AIDS education
in schools constitute preventive health care itself, but, if effective, it could help reduce the
number of future AIDS cases, thus lightening the cost of nationwide health care. In this
way, increased resources to education could in fact save the country vast amounts of money
in the long run.
190. Of course, this could cut the other way, too. Communities skeptical that AIDS is
transmitted through sex could conceivably become less enamored of school's role in
society. However, while this is a short term risk, it is more likely that the realities about
AIDS will ultimately take hold, and people will begin to recognize the importance of
disseminating life-saving information.
191. E.g., Survey: The Endless Assault, Economist, Feb. 24, 2001, at 7, 7-8
[hereinafter Endless Assault].
192. Thabo Mbeki, Building the Economy (Mar. 26, 1996), reprinted in Africa: The
Time Has Come: Selected Speeches of Thabo Mbeki 163, 165 (1998) [hereinafter Mbeki,
Speeches].
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nation building takes time, and the Court must realize that its decisions
today will sow the seeds for what the country can accomplish tomorrow.
It should not sacrifice the future benefits of better schools just because it
is impossible to know exactly what those benefits will be.
While these arguments militate in favor of affirming the Constitution's aspirational values, the opposing viewpoint is not a frivolous one.
There is a certain wisdom to the stance that the Court should not order
the government to do what it simply cannot. And yet, while this tension
should not be dismissed lightly, the ideals behind South Africa's Bill of
Rights are too important-and too firmly planted in the actual text of the
Constitution-to abandon, even if the logistics of implementation are difficult and unclear.
III.

DEMOCRATIC THEORIES OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY

A. Political Theory and the Relevance of American Law
This Note has argued that current South African basic and further
education violate section 29, and that the Court should draw on both the
Constitution's text and its own precedent to hold that the government
needs to do more to improve the country's worst schools. However, while
the condition of South African schools and the relevant legal arguments
provide a good case for this outcome, the inquiry should not end there.
The argument that the worst schools fail to pass constitutional muster is
premised on an understanding of educational "adequacy" that needs to
be further explored."'
In addition to providing a theoretical underpinning for a constitutionally mandated standard of education, a definition of adequacy clarifies for the legislature the kind of education it must provide. Such a ruling, like Grootboom and TAC, defines the right for the state but ultimately
allows the other branches to craft a remedy. It also helps the Courtjustify
its action. From an instrumentalist perspective, the kind of open, democratic society envisioned by the new Constitution's framers demands adequate education. Without it, too many of society's social, political, and
economic goals will be unattainable. Thus, in the effort to define an "adequate education," the Court can also articulate political and philosophical reasons why it must hold unconstitutional the nation's education system. In fact, invoking such reasoning might also help the Courtjustify to
a potentially skeptical public why it has chosen to privilege education.
193. The principles of adequacy explored in this Part should apply to both basic and
further education. While the Constitution establishes a more absolute right to basic
education, schooling both before and after tenth grade plays a large role in nurturing a
healthy democracy. Thus, while the government need only make further education
"progressively" available, the further education that it is required to make available must
conform to the notions of adequacy articulated here. In other words, while the
government must provide basic education immediately and further education gradually,
both basic and further education must be "adequate" to meet the requirements of section
39.

20031

THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

To the extent that resources in South Africa are limited, a Court
decision ordering the state to do more to protect one right might come
at the expense of others. If the Court finds itself in the unenviable position of "rationing" rights, it could alsojustify its decision by connecting its
definition of "adequacy" to a philosophical discussion of education's crucial role in society, thereby suggesting that a good educational system can
help the country attain other protected rights. Education is then not
only a right but also a social foundation for other goals, a starting point
for a host of necessary social changes. 1 94 In this way, promoting education, while possibly constricting the state's ability to address other
problems in the short term, may foster the kind of social, political, and
economic growth that ultimately will allow the government to address
many other problems more successfully.
As previously noted, section 39 instructs the Court on where to look
for guidance in interpreting the Bill of Rights. Just as it proved helpful in
determining that section 29 establishes a right not merely to education
but to "adequate" education, so too can it help elucidate what "adequacy"
entails. Section 39 requires the Court to "promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom."' 9 5 While this provision does not explicitly instruct the Court
how to define "adequacy," it requires that the Court consult these values
to ascertain more specifically what kind of education the Constitution
mandates.
Section 39 also states that the court, in addition to examining international law, "may consider foreign law. 'q 96 American case law, particularly state decisions, is one place for the Court to search for theories linking education with democratic ideals. Over the past thirty years,
American plaintiffs have turned to state constitutions to find a right to
adequate education, 19 7 providing a wide body of reasoning from which
South Africa could draw. Many state constitution education clauses were
written in the nineteenth century and reflect the democratic ideals of the
common school movement, which created systems of public education

194. See supra notes 179-192 and accompanying text.
195. S. Afr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 39(1)(a); see also Enver Motala & John
Pampallis, Educational Law and Policy in Post-Apartheid South Africa, in Motala &
Pampallis, supra note 15, at 14, 30 (arguing that the state must intervene in education
policy so that education can help redress historical injustices, ensure a human rights
culture, and permit all individuals to compete in the international economy).
196. S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights), § 39(1)(c).
197. In 1973, the United States Supreme Court held in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez that education is not a fundamental right under the Constitution and
that under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the poor are not a
"suspect" classification entitled to special protections. 411 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1973).
Consequently, the Texas school system in that case did not violate the Federal
Constitution, and future education-rights plaintiffs have needed to bring their claims
under state constitutional law.
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that attempted to foster democratic values) 9 8s Thus does the tradition of
these constitutions link education and democracy. Indeed, even as nineteenth century public officials tried to hammer out the details of the new
state constitutions, they "talked about the importance of a virtuous, intelligent, independent, rational, competent populace to guide the arm of

government."' 9 9 Such a Jeffersonian model of society necessitates public
schooling, 200 and it is this "republican" vision of "public virtue"20 1 that
provides the foundation for recent education-finance-reform litigation in
many American states.20 2 Significantly, since 1989 education-rights plaintiffs have prevailed in eighteen of twenty-eight decisions in the state high
20 4
courts, 203 and the school districts in question appear to be improving.
These decisions form a rich body of literature that the Constitutional
2 15
Court might consult.
Not only are the American cases rooted in the same democratic
kinds of ideals that section 39 espouses, but they also reflect a society
similar to South Africa in crucial ways. The Constitutional Court may be
able to find other countries whose laws fit its own more closely-Germany
and Canada, for instance, have constitutions and legal systems more akin
198. Rebell, supra note 68, at 245; see also Thomas James, Rights of Conscience and
State School Systems in Nineteenth Century America, in Toward a Usable Past: Liberty
Under State Constitutions 117, 121-22 (Paul Finkelman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991)
(discussing common schooling as one of great reform movements of nineteenth century);
G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions 131 (1998) (explaining that the new
constitutions of southern states during Reconstruction expanded government support for
education and other social programs).
Remaking State
199. Laura J. Scalia, America's Jeffersonian Experiment:
Constitutions 1820-1850, at 132 (1999).
200. See, e.g., Jefferson, supra note 1, at 148-49 (arguing that because the people
themselves are government's only "safe depositories," public education must be required).
201. Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 392 (Vt. 1997).
202. In forty-four of the fifty American states, plaintiffs have launched constitutional
challenges to state education finance systems. Rebell, supra note 68, at 218.
203. Id. at 228.
204. See Douglas S. Reed, On Equal Terms: The Constitutional Politics of
Educational Opportunity 22-29 (2001) (providing statistical evidence to argue that
education funding has become higher and more equal in states where school-financereform litigants won, suggesting that judicial remedies can in fact accomplish their
intended effects both generally and in the context of school reform). Of course, skeptics
might point out that many of these cases, such as the Abbott cases in NewJersey, have been
returning to the courts for decades, demonstrating that the judiciary's efforts to resolve

these issues have remained unsuccessful. See Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope:
Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 42-71 (1991) (arguing that courts are poor
midwives of social change and that judicial decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education
effected little reform during subsequent civil rights movement until other branches
intervened).
205. To be sure, the South African Court will be highly aware of differences between
the two countries. American commentators would be tunnel-visioned if they thought that
South Africa should look exclusively to American experiences, especially given American
public schools' shortcomings. Nevertheless, the American courts' reasoning might still
prove to be useful, and the different states' successes and failures could help elucidate the
relative merits of various judicial approaches.
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to South Africa's 2 06-but America's historical experiences make it a suitable place for South Africa to look on this topic. 20 7 South Africa and the
United States share vast disparities in wealth that make equal and adequate school funding difficult to attain. 208 Additionally, both South Africa and the United States can trace the inequities in their education systems back to state-sponsored racism: slavery, Jim Crow, and continued
segregation in America; apartheid in South Africa. 20 9 The remnants of
this racist heritage are very visible in both countries' schools; inequalities
210
Of
in both school systems tend to break down along racial lines.
course, the United States abandoned formal segregation decades ago,
while South Africa held its first democratic elections only in 1994. It is
for that very reason, though, that South Africa could learn from the past
several decades of American jurisprudence.
206. See, e.g.,Jeremy Sarkin, The Effect of Constitutional Borrowings on the Drafting
of South Africa's Bill of Rights and Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions, I U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 176, 184-87 (1998) (noting that provisions of South African Constitution have
origins in Canadian and German law); see also Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of
Powers, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 634, 640 (2000) (noting that the South African and Canadian
constitutions fit broad model of "constrained parliamentarianism"); Ruti Teitel,
Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, 106 Yale L.J.
2009, 2060 n.205 (1997) (discussing affinities between South Africa's and Germany's
postwar constitutions).
207. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 9, at 854, 861 (arguing that similarities in South
African and American history merit a comparison of the two countries' rights to
education). It is interesting to note that South Africans themselves sometimes point to
America's racial problems to highlight the "mundane and systematic character of
oppression" and to argue that in both South Africa and the United States, the lack of
access to adequate education is due to "second generation discrimination." E.g., John
Powell, Affirmative Action in Education: A Second Look, Mail & Guardian (S. Afr.), Feb.
23-Mar. 1, 2001, at 26 (South African newspaper article drawing on American experience
to argue for affirmative action in South African schools).
208. Most countries have disparities, but South Africa's and the United States's are
particularly pronounced. Since local communities often fund public schools (directly in
South Africa, through property taxes in the United States), these inequities translate
directly into uneven schools. See Reed, supra note 204, at 94-95 (noting that while many
Americans believe school funding ought to be equal, few Americans are actually willing to
pay higher taxes or help fund non-local school districts); R. Craig Wood & David C.
Thompson, Educational Finance Law: Constitutional Challenge to State Aid Plans-An
Analysis of Strategies 16 (1996) (explaining that while state taxes generate the base of
school funding, local school boards generally are responsible for raising the rest of their
revenue, so that wealthier districts which can generate higher property taxes are able to
provide better schools); supra Part I (discussing why South African schools remain
unequal).
This Note does not argue that increased funding alone is sufficient to provide an
adequate education. However, because a quality education incurs so many expensesteacher salaries, school supplies, school facilities, etc.-this author does believe that
substantial funding is necessary to provide adequate education.
209. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African
Courts: Similarities and Differences, in The Unpredictable Constitution 26, 27-29
(Norman Dorsen ed., 2002) (comparing and contrasting American and South African
racism).
210. Diamond, supra note 9, at 912.
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A South African court can, of course, consider multiple aspects of
the American decisions, such as their remedies. 2 1' It can also explore the
increased interaction in America between different branches of government, as courts and legislatures struggle to decide exactly what kind of
education is required and how best to provide it. 2 12 It is the political
philosophies underlying those decisions, though, that will be especially
helpful to a South African court seeking to define the scope of the constitutional right and to balance social aspirations against fiscal realities. Indeed, theories that see education as central to the political process, socialization, and economic opportunity speak not just broadly to education's
general importance but more specifically to the difficulties facing South
Africa today.
B. Education and the PoliticalProcess
Education is vital for a society that relies on democratic elections to
choose its government officials and decide important public policy issues. 2 13 Almost a century and a half ago, Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that in democratic societies like the United States, "the instruction
of the people powerfully contributes to the support of the democratic
211. See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997) (requiring sound
education to provide sufficient ability to read, write, and speak English; sufficient
fundamental knowledge of geography, history, and basic economic and political systems;
sufficient academic and vocational skills to engage in postsecondary education or
vocational training; and sufficient academic and vocational skills to enable students to
compete on an equal basis with others); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d
139, 150-51 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Tennessee Constitution, which requires state education
to provide "opportunity to acquire general knowledge, develop powers of reasoning and
judgment, and generally prepare students intellectually for a mature life"); Campaign for
Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 483-87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001), rev'd 744 N.Y.S.2d 130
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (noting that to achieve "foundational skills that students need to
become productive citizens capable of civic engagement and sustaining competitive
employment," school systems need sufficient numbers of qualified teachers and
administrators, appropriate class sizes, adequate and accessible school buildings, sufficient
and up-to-date books and supplies, suitable curricula, adequate resources for students with
extraordinary needs, and a safe, orderly environment); see also Abbott v. Burke III, 643
A.2d 575, 576 (N.J. 1994) (court retaining right to intervene if needs of poorer districts are
not met). Note that even though the New York Appellate Division reversed the New York
Supreme Court's 2001 CFE decision, the case is being appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals, and, at any rate, the South African judiciary is free to borrow from any foreign
decision, regardless of whether it actually carried the day. Chaskalson et al., supra note 61,
at 41-16-41-19.
212. See generally Liebman & Sabel, supra note 173, at 4 ("The core substantive
commitment of the emergent system is the provision to all students, and particularly to
racial and other minorities, whom the public schools have traditionally short-changed, of
an adequate education, where the definition of adequacy is continuously revised in the
light of the improving performance of the best schools.").
213. Section 39 explicitly refers to these concerns, requiring courts to promote values
underlying "an open and democratic society." S. Mr. Const. ch. 2 (Bill of Rights),
§ 39(1)(a).
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republic."2 1 4 Indeed, many would argue that democratic citizenship
comes with responsibility, and that citizens need the skills to deliberate
carefully.2 1 5 Thus does South Africa, which held its first democratic elections in 1994, have an interest in an educated populace capable of making thoughtful decisions and contributing to an open, democratic society.
In fact, some critics believe that South Africa's greatest political weakness
is its lack of a viable opposition party. Because it was the party of Nelson
Mandela and liberation, the ANC is indisputably the dominant political
party in South Africa today, so much so that some feel it has become, at
best, less dynamic and, at worst, corrupt. 2 1 6 To the extent this might be
true, education could play a key role in sharpening the populace's critical
thinking skills so that they hold the government more accountable for its
shortcomings. The Court should make explicit the connection between
education and democracy, both to define "adequacy" and to justify its
decision. Doing so might help the Court make clear that it does not intend to usurp the legislative function, because the Court would be explaining a potentially counter-majoritarian 21 7 decision in democratic
terms.
American state cases provide examples of such justifications. In a
New York case, for instance, the court asserted that students needed a
basic education that would allow them to "function productively as civic
participants capable of voting and serving on a jury. '21 8 A California
court noted that "education prepares students for active involvement in
political affairs .... [It] stimulates an interest in the political process and
provides the intellectual and practical tools necessary for political action.
Indeed, education may well be the dominant factor in influencing politi2 19
cal participation and awareness."
Even the United States Supreme Court, which does not recognize a
national right to education, has reasoned similarly. Most famously, the
Court in Brown v. Board of Education unanimously asserted "the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the per214. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 329 (Henry Reeve trans., Vintage
Books 1945) (1839).
215. E.g., Richard Arneson & Ian Shapiro, Democratic Autonomy and Religious
Freedom: A Critique of Wisconsin v. Yoder, in Democracy's Place 137, 147-48 (lan Shapiro
ed., 1996) [hereinafter Shapiro, Democracy's Place].
216. See, e.g., Courtney Jung & Ian Shapiro, South Africa's Negotiated Transition:
Democracy, Opposition, and the New Constitutional Order, in Shapiro, Democracy's
Place, supra note 215, at 184-87 (arguing that effective opposition to ANC government is
"virtually impossible"); see also Interview by Terry Gross with Archbishop Desmond Tutu
(Fresh Air, National Public Radio Broadcast, Nov. 2, 1999) (discussing negative
ramifications of lack of viable opposition party in South Africa).
217. See Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the
Bar of Politics 16-17 (1962).
218. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995).
219. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 40-41 (Cal. 1984) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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formance of our most basic public responsibilities ...."220 Remarkably,
even in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which refused
to recognize a federal right to education, the majority acknowledged that
democracy "depends on an informed electorate: a voter cannot cast his
ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and thought processes have
22
been adequately developed." '
It is significant that this argument appeals even to the United States
Supreme Court. While many, including the four dissenting justices, believe that Rodriguez was wrongly decided-that the Supreme Court ought
to have struck down the Texas school funding program-the case is certainly close enough that reasonable people can differ over the wisdom of
its holding; the outcome might seem unjust, but the majority is correct
that, even though education is vital to a healthy democracy, the United
States Constitution does not explicitly provide for it.222 By way of contrast, the South African Constitution does. If the connection between
education and democracy made sense to a United States Supreme Court
reluctant to acknowledge socioeconomic rights, then surely it is appropriate for a South African Constitutional Court whose Constitution explicitly
instructs it to do so.
C. Education and Socialization
Any definition of educational adequacy also must recognize that education serves a crucial function of binding people together in democratic
societies. Education theoristJohn Dewey saw one of its chief functions as
socializing youth into a democratic culture, 223 and, while education's
goals are hardly limited to this, school frequently offers children their
first connections with their peers. Thus, for Dewey, curricular details
were less important than the larger question of how education enables
224
the child to become a full member of society.
This theory of education seems especially relevant to South Africa, a
country struggling to reconcile itself with the horrors of its past. Instilling
220. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Though San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973), closes the door on the
possibility of a federal right to education, Brown is still of tremendous symbolic importance
in education rights, particularly for a country like South Africa struggling with some of the
same racial issues America was struggling with then. Its dictum on education may not be
good American federal law, but it is the kind of philosophical statement that would be
especially noteworthy for South African courts examining foreign law. See Chaskalson et
al., supra note 61, at 41-19 (discussing Rodriguez to suggest that South African courts can
learn more from its affirmation of education's importance than from its ultimate holding).
221. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36.
222. But see Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55-58 (1990) (determining that federal
court could require school district to impose taxes in excess of state statutory limits to fund
school desegregation plan). Jenkins certainly does not overrule Rodriguez, but it suggests
that Rodriguez might not be the death knell of federal constitutional educational rights.
223. Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism 175 (1995).
224. Id. at 182-83.
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a sense of community and civic virtue is a step towards a national understanding similar to that sought by the country's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. 225 For a country whose constitution values "human dignity"
and whose society struggles to come to terms with a brutal past and a
violent present, 2 26 education serves an especially crucial state function of
trying to instill in its citizens a sense of respect for other human beings.
Several American education decisions reflect a similar vision of education's role in society. Brown asserted that education "is the very foundation of good citizenship. '2 27 More recently, the California Supreme
Court, in asserting free public education's central role in democratic society, noted "education serves as a unifying social force among our varied
population, promoting cohesion based upon democratic values. '228 Another California judge, drawing on similar principles, quoted Dewey's argument that "[t] he only way to prepare for social life is to engage in social
life.",229
Similarly, education serves an important function in a liberal, plural
society. 230

To serve a country well, education needs to bring together

children from different backgrounds. 23 1 This ideal conforms closely to
South Africa's vision of itself as a "rainbow" nation 23 2 "committed to the
2 33
Of
building of a democratic, non-racial, and non-sexist" country.
course, since South African society remains so segregated, it will be difficult to integrate the school system completely, but the country must make
an effort because, as Dewey recognized, schools are the key social institu234
tions in building an integrated, multicultural society.

225. See generally Desmond Mpilo Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (1999)
[hereinafter Tutu, Forgiveness] (arguing that TRC was essential step towards achieving
national reconciliation); Paul van Zyl, Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 52 J. Int'l Aff. 647, 663 (1999) (exploring
paradoxes in truth commission model but concluding that "[t]ruth has a democratizing
effect because it is more difficult to sustain arbitrary and repressive rule in a society
comprised of citizens who know the terrible costs of human rights abuse").
226. See, e.g., Endless Assault, supra note 191, at 7 (exploring why South Africa has
become "one of the most violent countries in the world").
227. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
228. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 41 (Cal. 1984) (internal quotations omitted).
229. Smith v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 844 P.2d 500, 526 (Cal. 1993) (Arabian, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
230. See Ryan, supra note 223, at 364 (noting Dewey's defenses of multicultural
education as integral to liberal, plural society).
231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Tutu, Forgiveness, supra note 225, at 87 (discussing the moral victory
that all South Africans-the "rainbow people of God"-experienced upon defeat of
apartheid).
233. Thabo Mbeki, We Have Come Home: Remarks at Opening Session of the
Organisation of African Unity Conference of Ministers of Information (Oct. 4, 1995),
reprinted in Mbeki, Speeches, supra note 192, at 195, 196.
234. Ryan, supra note 223, at 364; see also Liebman & Sabel, supra note 173, at
135-36 (concluding that standards-based reform movement in United States provides
encouraging method of dealing with racial issues in aftermath of desegregation).
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The Constitutional Court can again turn to American decisions to
find these principles. In Sheff v. O'Neill, in which the Connecticut Supreme Court required that the education guaranteed in the state constitution be consistent with the contemporary meaning of "an adequate education," a concurring judge discussed the significance of scholastic
racial diversity to our broader democratic society:
Children of every race and ethnic background suffer when an
educational system is administered on a segregated basis ....
[I]n our multicultural world, [education] includes the development of social understanding and racial tolerance. If the mission of education is to prepare our children to survive and succeed in today's world, then they must be taught how to live
together as one people. Anything less will surely result in a segregated society with one racial and ethnic community pitted
2 35
against another.
Nowhere should this vision of education fostering interracial unity
be more applicable than South Africa. Theories of socialization and multiculturalism might not be enough on their own to provide an independent theoretical foundation for a rigorous definition of "adequacy," but
given their relevance to South Africa's ongoing transition and the virtues
espoused by some of the country's leading public intellectuals, such as
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 23"6 they certainly merit mention.
D. Education and Economic Opportunity
Section 39's promotion of dignity, equality, and freedom also implicates economic rights. When it determined that long-term equality required a commitment to a free market economy, the ANC government
abandoned its revolutionary Marxist leanings and committed itself to capitalism.2 37 In recent years, it has further strengthened that commitment,
opting to reduce the deficit at the expense of social programs; fiscal discipline, the government decided, would be the engine for future economic
growth. 238 For that new economy to achieve the government's goals,
though, people must be given the skills to fuel that development. Without solid schooling, many people will lack the chance to do so, and
235. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1294 (Conn. 1996) (Berdon, J., concurring).
236. See, e.g., Tutu, Forgiveness, supra note 225, at 7-8 (discussing first democratic
elections' transformative effects on whites and blacks and arguing that "South Africans will
survive and prevail only together, black and white").
237. See, e.g., Sparks, supra note 6, at 366-67 (discussing weakening of South African
Communist Party and rift between ANC and Communist ideologues upon liberation); see
also Thabo Mbeki, Transforming the Economy of South Africa: Remarks at the South
African Chamber of Business Annual Banquet (Sept. 14, 1995), reprinted in Mbeki,
Speeches, supra note 192, at 96, 97 (stating that "as government we have the responsibility
to... evolve policies which will produce conditions of stability and engender confidence in
private investors that we are able to manage the economy in a responsible manner").
238. See, e.g., Oldfield, supra note 15, at 44-45; Nicolaou, supra note 16, at 89.
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growth will be constrained by a population consisting of only a small percentage of educated elites capable of handling sophisticated jobs.
American courts have also recognized education's centrality in a
well-functioning capitalist society. Brown noted that education was a principal instrument "in preparing [students] for later professional training"
and continued that "it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education." 239 Another court bluntly asserted that without the right to educa240
tion, "neither the student nor the state has a future."
A recent New York decision was more specific:
Today's economy demands that all high school graduates,
whether they are continuing their education or are moving directly into the workforce, have higher levels of skills and
knowledge....
[T] he minimum skills necessary to compete successfully for
good jobs are high-level academic skills. Opportunities for lesseducated workers are likely to keep declining, while continued
increases in the service sector will bring more good jobs to people with computer skills who are literate, can
write, and are well24 1
grounded in science and mathematics.
South Africa's economy and job market are, to be sure, different
from New York's, but as it strives to be an economic leader in sub-Saharan
Africa, South Africa too will have increasing numbers of jobs requiring
high-level academic skills. And, of course, not only will the country want
people to be able to fill those jobs, but only those individuals possessing
such skills will have a real chance to compete in the marketplace. Quite
simply, as the California Supreme Court put it, education "prepares individuals to participate in the institutional structures . ..that distribute
economic opportunities and exercise economic power. Education holds
out a bright hope for the poor and oppressed to participate fully in the
'242
economic life of ... society.
Under this theory, then, education is less about "encouraging the
very cleverest to climb the highest intellectual peaks," and more about
"making children competent members of society." 2 43 As Jefferson argued, one of education's main functions is to allow people to develop
239. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
240. Fla. Dep't of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944, 948 (Fla. 1993).
241. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 487 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001)
(quoting the 1996 National Education Summit) (internal quotation marks omitted). But
see Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(reversing DeGrasse's decision because controlling precedent requires State "to provide a
minimally adequate educational opportunity, but not.., to guarantee some higher, largely
unspecified level of education"). The Campaign for Fiscal Equity is appealing to the New
York Court of Appeals.
242. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 41 (Cal. 1984) (internal quotations omitted).
243. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 667; see also Ryan, supra note 223, at 148 (discussing
Dewey's theories of education).
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their "worth and genius" regardless of "wealth, birth or other accidental
condition."2 44 Thus are the purposes of education laws "to provide an
education adapted to the years, to the capacity, and the condition of
' 245
every one, and directed to their freedom and happiness."
Such an egalitarian vision of society, directed towards people's freedom and happiness, well suits South Africa's needs. It is perhaps under
this theory that the current school system's inequality246 seems most unjust and most contrary to the country's ideals and goals. While many
American state court decisions focus more on the issue of adequacy than
equality, 24 7 some do emphasize notions of equality. In particular, the
New Jersey Abbott cases have repeatedly struck down state education legislation, because it does not fund rich and poor schools equally. In Abbott
v. Burke II, the state Supreme Court held that the state's education legislation was unconstitutional as applied to poorer urban schools. 24 8 When
the case returned to its docket a few years later, the Court struck down
the state's Quality Education Act because of its "failure to assure parity of
regular education expenditures between the special needs districts and
the more affluent districts. 2 4'These decisions are directly applicable to a section 9 equality claim
under South Africa's Constitution, and, importantly, further elucidate
why the current education system fails to meet section 39 ideals. Equal
education is important notjust as its own end, but also because without it,
future equality will be almost impossible to achieve in other sectors of life.
Indeed, without more equal education, South African society will continue to resemble the world of apartheid. It remains one of the most
unequal societies in the world. 251) Thus, while the country's political
changes are encouraging, the fact remains that everyday life has changed
244. Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson 63 (1991)
(discussing Jefferson's theory of egalitarian education).
245. Jefferson, supra note 1, at 147 (defending Virginia's new education laws); see
also Ryan, supra note 223, at 181 (describing Dewey's theory that education ought not
merely provide people with skills needed for jobs, but skills that would guarantee they have
satisingjobs); Sen, supra note 73, at 75 (discussing capability theory).
246. See supra Parts I & II.B.3.
247. Reed, supra note 204, at 12; see also William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe:
The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation,
75 Va. L. Rev. 1639, 1640-42, 1656 (1989) (discussing both litigation focusing on
educational adequacy and suits focusing on equality).
248. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990); see also Serrano v.
Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 952-53, 957-58 (Cal. 1976) (holding that California public school
financing violated equal protection provisions of state constitution by conditioning
availability of school revenues upon district wealth, resulting in disparities in school
revenue, and by making quality of education dependent upon level of district
expenditure); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (finding equal protection
problem in school financing system which resulted in significant disparities between
wealthy and poor school districts).
249. Abbott v. Burke (Abbott 1II), 643 A.2d 575, 576 (N.J. 1994).
250. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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little for the poorest South Africans. 25 1 The chance to extend economic
opportunity to communities that have never experienced it should serve
as a strong justification for a Court holding that the government needs to
do more to provide better schools.

CONCLUSION

South Africa's Constitution explicitly recognizes the right to education, and yet many South African schools fall far short of the constitutional requirement. The worst schools-mostly in predominantly black
areas-lack the resources to provide students with the education they
need to participate effectively in a democratic, capitalist society. Consequently, despite the past decade's remarkable political changes, many
South Africans have little more chance to better their lot in life than they
had under apartheid.
Notwithstanding serious budgetary concerns, the Constitutional
Court should vindicate education rights for the nation's most deprived
students. Given the Constitution's language in section 29, its commitment to democratic values in section 39, and the Court's prior reasoning
in Grootboom and TAC, the Court has solid legal arguments for requiring
the government to provide better education. Due to the country's economic shortcomings and basic separation-of-powers concerns, the Court
must leave room for the legislature to fashion realistic remedies. Nevertheless, following its earlier cases, it can do so while still promoting the
constitutional values of dignity, equality, and freedom. Indeed, the Constitutional Court's very role in the South African system is to protect the
most vulnerable by promulgating the ideals that the other government
branches need to meet.
It is for the promotion of these ideals that education is so vital in
many societies, especially for a country like South Africa striving to right
the wrongs of its past. Education is not merely an end in itself, but also a
means to address many other social problems. Democratic ideals-which
American case law can help elucidate-thus provide both a baseline for
defining educational adequacy and a philosophical rationale for a Court
decision requiring the government to provide its citizens with better
schools.
251. See, e.g., Venter, supra note 160, 18-26 (arguing that South Africa's masses in
townships and squatter camps will eventually rise up in frustration because their living
conditions have changed little since the ANC government came to power).

